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Abstract
Among the many concerns about universal basic income (UBI or basic income), two of the most 
commonly expressed are that it would have undesirable distributional consequences (by failing 
adequately to compensate the recipients of withdrawn benefits) and that it would erode work 
incentives (via higher tax levels). This paper addresses these concerns, building on our previous 
working paper The Fiscal and Distributional Implications of Alternative Universal Basic Income 
Schemes in the UK in two main ways: 
• By exploring the distributional consequences in greater depth
• By exploring outcomes of UBI schemes in relation to static financial work incentives  
We examine three schemes, argued to be the most plausible of those modelled in the previous 
working paper, and pitched at three levels of generosity. These are: 
• UBI set at the level of the tax saving implied by personal income tax allowance (PITA)
• UBI set at the level of existing benefits
• UBI set at the level of existing benefits with premiums for individuals determined as disabled 
or severely disabled 
This report makes a number of original contributions to the literature. In terms of the 
distributional consequences of the schemes modelled here, we determine the proportions of 
households in different income and demographic groups that would expect to gain or lose 
out financially. The proportions of households gaining and losing from reform is important, as 
positive distributional effects on aggregate can mask significant losses for some households, 
including the most vulnerable. Another major contribution is that we analyse the schemes’ 
distributional consequences with respect to the characteristics of disability status and gender 
at the individual and household levels, going beyond the ‘standard’ distributional categories 
presented in existing studies. 
Our main findings suggest that when we pay for a UBI by withdrawing a large number of 
benefits and increasing payroll taxes, large numbers of households will inevitably experience 
significant losses of income. More significantly, despite the generally progressive character of 
the schemes modelled here, these losses are not concentrated among richer groups; on the 
contrary, they are proportionally larger for the bottom three income quintiles. While the specific 
patterns of winners and losers varies with the details of each scheme, when we eliminate the 
mainstay of means-tested support in line with the UBI payment, women lose out on aggregate 
compared to men – and disabled people lose out compared to non-disabled people unless 
additional premiums are paid on top of the uniform UBI. These are important concerns that 
anyone hoping to design ethically desirable and politically feasible UBI schemes need to address. 
Turning to our contribution in relation to financial work incentives, we construct indicators of 
‘participation tax rates’ (PTRs) and ‘marginal effective tax rates’ (METRs) which describe financial 
incentives to work at all, and financial incentives to progress in work or increase work effort 
marginally, respectively. We also construct indicators of the proportions of households facing 
improved, deteriorating or unchanged financial work incentives as a result of the reforms. 
We find that on average, PTRs and METRs increase as a result of all three illustrative basic 
income schemes, a consequence of tax increases and the elimination of the personal allowance. 
However, this does not mean that the schemes modelled here would necessarily have negative 
consequences with respect to labour market participation. We find that the lower income 
quintiles, workless households, and households in receipt of at least one means-tested benefit 
tend to contain larger proportions of households facing improved PTRs. It is highly plausible that 
the effects of stronger work incentives on particularly sensitive groups may outweigh the more 
generalised effect of weaker work incentives over the wider population.
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4Introduction
In this second IPR microsimulation report, we extend the analysis carried out 
in Martinelli (2017) in two significant ways: 
• By exploring in greater depth the distributional consequences of a subset 
of basic income schemes
• By introducing a number of new outcome variables relating to financial 
work incentives 
Specifically, in relation to the first point, we construct a new set of dummy 
variables corresponding to whether and the extent to which households have 
gained or lost out financially as a result of the reforms. The proportions of 
households gaining and losing from reform is important, as positive distribu-
tional/poverty alleviation effects on aggregate can mask significant losses 
within specific households. For example, households in the lowest income 
quintile may gain on average and poverty rates may fall across the population, 
while at the same time a significant proportion of disadvantaged households 
fall further into poverty. 
As well as constructing these new outcome variables, we provide a more 
detailed account of how the gains and losses are distributed across different 
groups. Specifically, we construct a set of new categorical grouping vari-
ables that correspond to characteristics of disability status and gender at the 
individual and household levels1, and report outcomes by labour market status 
at a higher level of disaggregation than in the previous paper2. 
In relation to the second point, we report data for participation tax rates 
(PTRs) (imputing part-time employment patterns for instances in which 
individuals do not work) and marginal effective tax rates (METRs). For both of 
these measures, we distinguish between primary and second earners within 
families, by identifying the adult with the highest level of individual income 
within each benefit unit. Next, we construct variables indicating whether each 
individual faces improved, deteriorating or unchanged financial work incen-
tives as a result of the reforms. Again, we examine these effects in relation to 
a number of categorical grouping variables noted above, but also based on 
household-level means-testing status, after constructing a categorical variable 
indicating recipiency of means-tested benefit.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review theoretical 
literature regarding the distributional effects in relation to sex and disability, 
and the consequences of basic income for work incentives and labour market 
participation. In doing so we provide our justification for the present study in 
terms of our contribution to contemporary debates. In Section 3, we outline 
our method and approach to the research problems previously highlighted. 
We describe and justify our selection of basic income schemes before also 
describing the operationalisation of variables constructed for the present 
1. Disability and gender are recorded in the Family Resources Survey at the individual level, so we construct 
household-level variables denoting head of household by sex and disability status, households comprising at 
least one disabled adult, and households comprising at least one disabled child.
2. Previously, distinction was only made between working and workless households; here, we distinguish 
between different combinations of full and part-time work, and between different causes of inactivity.
“The proportions of 
households gaining 
and losing from 
reform is important, 
as positive 
distributional/
poverty alleviation 
effects on aggregate 
can mask significant 
losses within 
specific households”
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study. Sections 4-6 present and provide discussion of our findings. Section 
4 looks at the distributional implications of the three schemes in terms of 
the proportions of households gaining and losing income, disaggregated by 
income quintile, family type and (detailed) labour market status. Section 5 
presents distributional implications based on the two additional categorical 
grouping variables not examined in our previous working paper: sex and 
disability. Section 6 examines the effects on (static) financial work incentives, 
disaggregating effects by breadwinner status, income quintile, labour market 
status and means-testing status. Section 7 concludes with a summary of our 
key findings and further discussion of their policy implications. 
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This paper examines the distributional and work incentive effects – sum-
marised above and described in more depth below – with respect to three 
alternative levels of basic income analysed in our previous working paper. 
First, we examine the existing literature to justify and frame the contribution 
of the present study. The first part of this section explores the rationale for 
expanding our previous analysis of the distributional effects of basic income, 
particularly with respect to the characteristics of disability and sex, while the 
second part reviews the literature on basic income, work incentives and labour 
market participation. 
Distributional Concerns with Respect to Basic Income 
Design
Now that basic income has achieved a level of prominence in the public 
debate and is being taken seriously as a realistic policy option, scrutiny of 
its implications has increased dramatically. This includes questions over 
the ‘affordability’ of proposals. But what does affordability really mean? As 
Van Parijs (2004: 18) observes, the question ‘is basic income affordable?’ 
is underspecified1: it depends upon the details of the scheme and what is 
meant by ‘affordable’. In the broadest sense, affordability simply implies that 
expenditure on basic income must not exceed available sources of revenue2 
in the long term (although more radical proposals, e.g. Crocker (2015), view 
deficit financing as feasible and indeed desirable). Assuming that new taxes 
can be introduced, rates of existing taxes can be varied, and revenues can be 
reallocated from other purposes to pay for a basic income, the very concept of 
‘affordability’ may be quite malleable. For example, Van Parijs (1991) argues in 
favour of a basic income set at the ‘highest sustainable level’, determined by 
1. He notes: “Phrased in this very general way, the question makes no sense. Let us bear in mind that it is 
not part of the definition of a basic income that it should be sufficient to satisfy the beneficiaries’ basic needs: 
consistently with its definition, the level of the basic income could be more and it could be less. Nor is it part of 
the definition of a basic income that it should replace all other cash benefits: a universal benefit need not be a 
single benefit. A meaningful answer can only start being given to the question of affordability if one specifies the 
level at which the basic income is to be pitched and stipulates which benefits, if any, it is to replace. Under some 
specifications—for example, “abolish all existing benefits and redistribute the corresponding revenues in the 
form of an equal low benefit for all”—the answer is trivially yes. Under other specifications—for example, “keep 
all existing benefits and supplement them with an equal benefit for all citizens at a level sufficient for a single 
person to live comfortably”—the answer is obviously no. Each of these absurd extreme proposals is sometimes 
equated, by definition, with basic income. But neither has, to my knowledge, been proposed by anyone. Every 
serious proposal lies somewhere in-between, and whether some basic income proposal is affordable must 
therefore be assessed case by case.”
2. Most practical proposals assume that a basic income would be funded through tax revenues, potential 
sources of which include taxes on income, wealth, consumption goods (e.g. VAT), environmental pollution (e.g. 
a carbon tax) and financial transactions. As Torry (2016a) notes, alternative sources of funding include dividends 
on publically-owned assets (‘sovereign wealth funds’). A number of scholars (e.g. Farley, 2016) have recently 
emphasised the benefits of funding a basic income through a land value tax – which, since supply of land is 
fixed, would avoid distortionary effects on production; such a tax would also be highly progressive, due to the 
concentrated nature of land ownership. However, irrespective of these arguments, concrete ‘costed’ proposals 
assume that schemes would be funded through taxes on employment income, at least partly because tax/
benefit microsimulation require comprehensive, representative data on the tax base, such as that provided 
through e.g. the Family Resources Survey for employment income; data allowing equivalent analysis of the 
distributional consequences of wealth taxes are not available.  
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practical limits on the scope for increasing tax revenues. For example, limits 
may arise as a result of behavioural change (such as reductions in work effort 
due to higher income taxes or changes in consumption habits due to taxes on 
luxury goods) as well as tax avoidance and evasion, the incentives for which 
increase in line with tax rates3. Turning to a more restrictive perception of 
affordability, accounting for concerns about public perceptions and political 
feasibility, Torry (2016a: 53) argues that to raise income tax rates “by more than 
say 3% would probably make a scheme impossible to implement”. 
Although the figure of 3% itself is somewhat arbitrary, the point is that the 
political feasibility of basic income – in relation to tax rises and perceptions 
of affordability – is crucially important. The problem for serious proponents 
of basic income is that – as explored in our previous working paper – there 
is a trade-off between the three goals of meeting need, controlling cost, and 
eliminating means-testing. In essence, the received wisdom among a number 
of commentators is that an affordable basic income would be inadequate and 
an adequate basic income would be unaffordable. The dilemma is partially 
mitigated by the possibility of retaining the existing structure of means-tested 
benefits, as in Torry (2016b) and Reed and Lansley (2016), which ensure 
minimal household losses at the point of implementation – but, as discussed 
in our previous working paper, would retain the attendant problems of means-
testing: bureaucratic complexity and dampened work incentives. 
In our previous working paper (Martinelli, 2017) we examined the distribu-
tional consequences of a large number of basic income schemes. Here, we 
build on that distributional analysis in two important ways. First, we construct 
a new set of dummy variables corresponding to whether and the extent to 
which households have gained or lost out financially as a result of the reforms. 
The proportions of households gaining and losing from reform is important, 
as positive distributional/poverty alleviation effects on aggregate can mask 
significant losses within specific households. For example, households in the 
lowest income quintile may gain on average and poverty rates may fall across 
the population, while at the same time a significant proportion of disadvan-
taged households fall further into poverty. Second, we provide a more detailed 
account of how the gains and losses are distributed across different groups. 
Specifically, we construct a set of new categorical grouping variables that cor-
respond to characteristics of disability status and gender at the individual and 
household levels4, and report outcomes by labour market status at a higher 
level of disaggregation than in the previous paper5.  
 
 
3. For example, the maximum sustainable income tax yield is achieved at rates far below 100%. For the UK, 
Brewer et al. (2010: 91) estimate that “the government would maximize the revenue it collects by imposing an 
overall marginal rate on the highest earners of 56.6%”; in contrast, focusing on US data, Saez and Piketty (2013) 
estimate that the revenue-maximising rate could potentially be as high as 83%.
4. Disability and gender are recorded in the Family Resources Survey at the individual level, so we construct 
household-level variables denoting head of household by sex and disability status, households comprising at 
least one disabled adult, and households comprising at least one disabled child. 
5. Previously, distinction was only made between working and workless households; here, we distinguish 
between different combinations of full and part-time work, and between different causes of inactivity.
“The problem for 
serious proponents 
of basic income is 
that [...] there is a 
trade-off between 
the three goals 
of meeting need, 
controlling cost, and 
eliminating means-
testing"
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Assessing the Impact of Basic Income on Disabled People
One of the most prominent criticisms of basic income schemes which replace 
most existing benefits with a uniform payment is that they cannot adequately 
cover the complex array of circumstances and needs for which social security 
systems are intended. As discussed in the previous working paper, prominent 
among such circumstances are those relating to disability6. It is therefore inter-
esting to consider the extent to which losses are indeed concentrated among 
households characterised (in different ways) by the incidence of disability, and 
the extent to which we can readily mitigate against these losses. 
In the main, basic income advocates dismiss the problem (that groups with 
additional complex needs would be disadvantaged by a system of uniform 
payments) by recourse to the (correct) assertion that nothing implies that 
basic income must replace all social security payments. As a result, it is easy 
to hypothesise a system of UBI being supplemented by additional payments 
corresponding to different categories of need. 
To avoid losses among individuals in receipt of various disability benefits 
(including premiums and supplements to benefits not paid exclusively in 
relation to disability, such as Income Support or Working Tax Credit (WTC)), it 
is most straightforward to model the retention of the entire existing structures 
of disability benefits for individuals, adjusting the means-tested ones by the 
amount of the basic income – as in Torry (2016b), for example. 
The unavoidable downside is that as a practical administrative matter, we 
would need to retain existing monitoring and policing systems in order to 
determine eligibility and prevent fraudulent claims; and yet it is precisely the 
elimination of such intrusive, stigmatising and bureaucratic processes that 
motivates much interest in basic income in the first place. 
While we acknowledge that differentiating payments based on disability 
status implies an unavoidable layer of bureaucracy, it is still possible to consid-
er how the latter could be minimised. It is important to note that UK disability 
benefits basically take two forms, depending on whether they are designed 
to act as income replacement resulting from incapacity – as in the case of 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) and formerly Incapacity Benefit – or 
whether they are designed to compensate for additional costs of disability 
irrespective of labour market participation – as in the case of Disability Living 
Allowance (DLA) and Personal Independence Payment (PIP). ESA is subject to a 
‘Work Capability Assessment’ and requires participation in ‘work-related activ-
ity’ (except for the most critically sick and disabled). It comes in two forms, 
means-tested and contributory, both of which impose further restrictions on 
eligibility. In contrast, DLA and PIP are universal (categorical) benefits assessed 
on the basis of difficulties with mobility, or with carrying out essential day-to-
day activities. 
6. Others include high and divergent housing costs and the divergent costs of raising children; in the 
following analysis, we address the problem of high and divergent housing costs by retaining the existing 
structure of housing benefits, and we address the costs of raising children by making payments to adults and 
children alike, setting the children’s basic income at levels approximating the support accruing to families in the 
existing means-tested system.
“It is therefore 
interesting to 
consider the extent 
to which losses are 
indeed concentrated 
among households 
characterised (in 
different ways) by 
the incidence of 
disability"
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The characteristics of these benefits present two justifications for our 
decision to model a scheme in which we eliminate ESA, leave DLA/PIP in place, 
and supplement disabled individuals with additional flat payments (a scheme 
similar to what Duffy (2016) calls ‘Basic Income Plus’). Firstly, the income 
replacement function of ESA means it resembles other income replacement 
benefits in basic payment structure; aside from any premiums and supple-
ments, it can readily be substituted for a basic income paid at a similar level of 
generosity. Secondly, ESA requires assessment on two levels (incapacity for 
work and eligibility on grounds of income or contributions history) which are 
at odds with the principles of basic income, where DLA/PIP only imposes one 
such condition (relating to assessment of need). 
The upshot is that a scheme in which ESA is eliminated and additional pay-
ments for disabled people are conceptualised and administered in the manner 
of DLA/PIP – as compensation for additional costs, irrespective of work status 
– is preferable to schemes in which the means-tested, incapacity-for-work-
conditional ESA is retained and adjusted by the value of basic income. The 
former scheme, an example of which we present here as Model C, appears to 
be closer to the principles of basic income which we are attempting to emu-
late, and would be administratively feasible with minimal changes to existing 
systems. 
Assessing the Impact of Basic Income on Gender Equality
 
Another interesting consideration is the extent to which the reforms have 
gendered effects. Following IFS (2011a: 1), while the UK social security system 
is formally neutral in the sense that “tax and benefit rules treat otherwise-
identical men and women equally”, nevertheless “it may be the case that 
men lose more than women from tax and benefit changes (or vice versa) 
because other characteristics such as income, time use and family structure 
differ systematically between men and women”. There is a large and growing 
feminist literature which interrogates the extent to which basic income is 
likely to mitigate or exacerbate gender inequalities. One of the core issues is 
whether basic income functions as an ‘emancipation fee’ or as ‘hush money’ 
(Robeyns, 2000). At risk of simplification, there are two alternative feminist 
perspectives on the way in which the welfare system should promote gender 
equality: those of ‘equality feminism’ and ‘difference feminism’, where “equality 
means treating women exactly like men, and where difference means treat-
ing women differently insofar as they differ from men” (Fraser, 1994: 594). As 
O’Reilly (2008) puts it, “Do we mean equality of outcomes in, for example, 
labour market participation and pay [or] in valuing different lifestyle prefer-
ences?” These questions, O’Reilly and others contend, have implications for 
the ways in and extent to which welfare policies may actually promote gender 
equality. Fraser (1994) concludes that public policy based on either of these 
contrasting positions is fatally flawed. According to McLean (2016), the central 
argument is that:
 
A caregiver parity model (whereby income supports are directed toward 
caregivers specifically) would lead to marginalisation, secluding women 
in the private sphere and perpetuating gender essentialism; on the other 
hand, the universal breadwinner model (whereby income supports are tied 
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to paid employment) would perpetuate androcentrism by emphasising 
masculine life-patterns and requiring women to conform to men’s stand-
ards in order to be considered equal.
Of course, UBI is not conditional on labour market or caring activities, so is, 
in principle, neutral on these matters; it “avoids the drawbacks of a universal 
breadwinner model that perpetuates androcentric assumptions about the 
nature of work” while simultaneously providing “a means of valuing the care 
work that cannot be provided via state or market” (ibid.). Because women tend 
to be disadvantaged in the labour market and do a disproportionate amount of 
part-time and low-paid work, basic income should strengthen their bargaining 
position relative to men, while at the same time enabling men to reduce their 
hours of paid work and shoulder a greater proportion of unpaid care work. 
However, in opposition to these arguments, feminist critics of basic income 
(e.g. Gheaus, 2008) observe that, given women’s already weaker attachment 
to the labour market, an unconditional income paid to men and women alike 
is expected to reinforce existing gender roles, exacerbating issues relating 
to dependence, intra-household inequality, and labour market disadvantage. 
These concerns are borne out in reference to existing experimental evidence 
(Widerquist, 2005) and labour market models (Sommer, 2016), which predict 
relatively small but significant contractions in female labour supply. On 
balance, feminist advocates of basic income recognise such problems and 
acknowledge that the policy insufficiently addresses structural factors that 
constrain women’s choices (O’Reilly, 2008), but nevertheless posit that UBI 
would represent an unequivocal improvement – “not because [it] favours 
women, but because the existing system favours men” (Parker, 1993).    
While we do not address these core issues directly, we present evidence on 
the likely distributional and work incentive effects of basic income schemes 
by gender. Following Keane et al. (2014: 15), because “most household 
surveys… [do not] identify the living standards of male and female members 
of couples” intra-household inequality cannot be directly measured and can 
only be imputed based on assumptions about income sharing. Such analysis 
being beyond the scope of the present paper, we follow DWP (2015: 140) in 
assuming “that both partners in a couple benefit equally from the household’s 
income, and will therefore appear at the same position in the income distribu-
tion”. The implication is that “any difference in figures can only be driven by 
gender differences for single adults, which will themselves be diluted by the 
figures for couples” (ibid.)7. In contrast, work incentives are measures at the 
individual (not household) level, so we are able to differentiate these effects 
more comprehensively by gender and ‘breadwinner’ status (i.e. whether an 
individual in a couple is the primary or secondary earner). Furthermore, we are 
able to identify whether couple households are male- or female-headed (as 
determined by the sex of primary and secondary earners), and thus go beyond 
analysing the distribution of income by sex across single households.
7. We acknowledge, following Hobson (1990: 235), that “this framework for analysing inequality leaves 
out the important dimension of power and dependency in the family and how it affects the distribution of 
resources”; this is an important and lamentable limitation of the present research.
“Feminist critics 
of basic income 
observe that, given 
women’s already 
weaker attachment 
to the labour market, 
an unconditional 
income paid to 
men and women 
alike is expected to 
reinforce existing 
gender roles"
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Work Incentives
One of the most contested areas of basic income debate relates to work 
incentives and labour market participation. This is perhaps inevitable, given 
the dearth of direct empirical evidence. The theoretical evidence is also incon-
clusive, with several complex factors interacting to determine basic income’s 
effect on the labour market. 
At issue is the (relative) magnitude of two effects, termed ‘substitution’ 
and ‘income’ effects (see Gamel et al. (2006) and Gilroy et al. (2012) for more 
comprehensive discussions). Let us assume the economy is comprised of two 
‘goods’: consumption and leisure. Ceteris paribus, a rational, utility-optimising 
individual would like more of both, but must instead optimise the level of each 
according to her preferences and subject to a ‘budget constraint’. The price of 
each good is determined by the quantity she would be required to sacrifice in 
order to afford an additional unit of the other good.   
• The substitution effect relates to how much leisure she must sacrifice for 
more income; in other words, the financial return to labour, as defined by 
the slope of the budget constraint. This depends on taxes on employment 
income as well as, crucially, the extent to which benefits paid to inactive 
and/or low-income individuals are withdrawn as the individual enters 
employment or earns more money. Indicators of these concepts include 
the participation and marginal effective tax rates, both of which feature in 
the present study; their operationalisation is discussed in Section 3.  
• The income effect relates to how much leisure and income the individual 
chooses to enjoy as a result of being able to afford more or less of both; in 
other words, the income effect is the effect of a price change abstracting 
from the change in relative prices between consumption and leisure. If 
we consider the counterfactual with no social transfers, the income effect 
of implementing any social transfer scheme could only be to increase 
or leave unchanged the level of leisure that an individual would choose 
to enjoy. The more generous the payment – and the more desirable the 
bundle of consumption and leisure she can afford as a result of the transfer 
– the more likely it is that she would choose to reduce her labour effort.    
The substitution and income effects of tax and benefit changes can work in 
opposite directions. Consider an increase in tax on earned income. Working 
would become relatively less attractive compared to not working, since the 
effective wage rate would have fallen; the individual might choose to reduce 
their work effort accordingly. On the other hand, the individual would have to 
work even more to consume as much as before – and, given their preferences, 
might choose to swap leisure for additional consumption (i.e. increase their 
work effort). A priori, we cannot know the relative size of each of these effects.   
So it is in relation to basic income, to which the combined labour market 
response is fundamentally ambiguous: it is expected to vary according to 
the specifics of each UBI scheme and the counterfactual to which they are 
being compared; according to individual characteristics with respect to 
labour market attachment (i.e. bargaining position and preferences); and 
according to the decisions of other household members in the context of 
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income-sharing. Then there is the fact that revenue-neutral schemes almost 
inevitably imply significant increases in direct taxation, as well as reducing 
high participation and marginal effective tax rates for people previously 
subject to means-testing. Specific impacts will depend not just on changes to 
the benefit structure, but on the changes in tax burdens that make the former 
possible. Another complication relates to the role of conditions and punitive 
measures associated with income replacement benefits, and the extent to 
which an unconditional basic income lacking these features would be more 
susceptible to free-riding. 
 
Reduction of Marginal Effective Tax Rates Compared to Means-Tested 
Safety Nets
 
On the one hand, basic income is held up as one of several ways in which 
to reduce high marginal effective tax rates – characteristic of means-tested 
systems – which cause poverty and unemployment traps. In this sense, 
the implementation of a non-withdrawable basic income partly or fully in 
replacement of means-tested support would tend to increase the incentives 
for inactive individuals to enter paid employment, since there would be a 
significant positive return to employment at any wage rate, for any number 
of hours, and of any contractual duration. It is well known that in the existing 
UK system individuals routinely face effective marginal tax rates in excess of 
90%: as Brewer et al. (2010: 92) observe, “the amount of gross income taken 
in tax and withdrawn benefits when people enter work at low earnings is too 
high: for most groups it is close to 100% before individuals are entitled to the 
Working Tax Credit”. Furthermore, although in-work benefits such as WTC 
mitigate against unemployment traps, they create poverty traps due to 
high withdrawal rates further up the income distribution (Brewer et al. report 
marginal rates of 73.4%). While the implementation of Universal Credit (UC) 
promises to reduce the maximum marginal effective tax rate that households 
should face (to 76%), some households will face weaker work incentives (IFS, 
2011b); the extent to which the policy will ‘make work pay’ is actually quite 
limited, this core goal having been diluted by fiscal constraints which “risk 
leaving UC as little more than a vehicle for rationalising benefit administration 
and cutting costs to the Exchequer… UC will on balance be less generous than 
the tax credit system for working families” (Resolution Foundation, 2016: 3, 8). 
  
Removal of Bureaucratic Traps
 
As well as facing weak financial incentives, individuals entangled in the UK’s 
system of means-tested benefits are subject to bureaucratic traps. These 
occur when claimants are reluctant to enter employment due to uncertainty 
about how the change of circumstance will affect their entitlement to benefit 
due to the justifiable fear of “losing their benefits for certain periods of time” 
or facing delays in payment when shifting between different circumstances 
(Kalliomaa-Puha et al., 2016), even when the change of circumstance should 
result in a financial improvement. The effects of bureaucratic traps are particu-
larly pronounced when individuals receive ‘passported’ benefits connected to 
their inactive labour market status (SSAC, 2012).  
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Generalised Increase in Rate of Tax on Employment 
 
On the other hand, there are reasons to think that basic income serves to 
reduce financial incentives to work in several ways. These relate to requisite 
increases in tax rates and to the unconditional nature of basic income, which 
implies the removal of labour market behavioural conditions and punitive 
sanctions.     
For one, it should be recalled that the aforementioned positive effects are 
in principle confined to recipients of means-tested benefits. While it is true 
that this is an extremely important group when addressing concerns relating 
to labour market participation8, we have to consider work incentive effects 
for the wider population as well. For individuals not receiving means-tested 
benefits in the existing system, the effects seem likely to run counter to 
those described above. Almost all attempts at devising feasible basic income 
schemes incorporate significant increases in income tax rates as well as the 
elimination of personal allowance; this is certainly the case for the revenue-
neutral schemes modelled for this working paper. It is important to consider, 
therefore, the extent to which these generalised tax increases might have 
adverse effects on labour market supply. 
Meghir and Phillips (2010) provide a comprehensive overview of the large 
literature on taxation and labour supply, covering both theoretical economic 
models and empirical econometric studies. As suggested above, higher 
marginal rates of tax tend to lead to less work, but it is also possible that “when 
the income effect dominates the substitution effect at high hours of work it 
may increase effort” (ibid.: 207). In other words, the theoretical evidence on 
the effect of tax increases is ambiguous; although there is general consensus 
that the substitution effect tends to exceed the income effect for changes 
in marginal rates, the effect varies significantly across different groups. It is 
also worth noting that workers do not have complete flexibility to vary their 
hours of work; in the context of fixed hour contracts, incentives would have to 
change quite dramatically for them to withdraw their labour entirely, even if 
it were optimum for them to do so. Meghir and Phillips (ibid.: 204) summarise 
the voluminous empirical evidence as follows:  
Hours of work do not respond particularly strongly to the financial incen-
tives created by tax changes for men, but they are a little more responsive 
for married women and lone mothers. On the other hand, the decision 
whether or not to take paid work at all is quite sensitive to taxation and 
benefits for women and mothers in particular.
 
Mass Withdrawal of Labour Supply?
 
Concerns about mass withdrawal from the labour market as a result of an 
unconditional basic income are usually raised in the context of two attributes: 
generosity and lack of conditions of eligibility. Of course, as noted previously, 
8. As discussed above, members of this group are subject to extremely high participation and marginal 
effective tax rates which are linked to high rates of inactivity and poverty.
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there is nothing inherent in the concept of basic income that suggests that 
payment would cover so-called ‘basic needs’ any more generously than a 
conditional or means-tested system of minimum income would do. It is non-
sensical to suggest that basic income is more likely to lead to labour market 
withdrawal for this reason; the level is simply not specified. 
However, the contention that basic income will result in labour market 
withdrawal due to the income effect permitting people to enjoy more leisure 
whilst maintaining their levels of consumption – a function of the generosity 
of payments in combination with their unconditional nature – must at least 
be taken seriously. The lack of behavioural conditions makes ‘idleness’ less 
costly and therefore relatively more attractive. Under a conditional system, 
claimants undertake to participate in job search requirements and to attend 
sessions organised by Job Centre Plus. Even assuming that one can ‘pay lip 
service’ to these requirements with little chance of punitive action, a) doing so 
is technically fraud, and b) it would still require considerable effort on the part 
of the claimant. The lack of means-testing criteria implies that large swathes 
of the population who were previously required to work in order to top up their 
incomes through Tax Credits would no longer have to do so. Returning to the 
issue of generosity, it is evident that withdrawal from the labour market is likely 
to be more widespread the higher the level of payments.
Neoclassical models necessarily postulate that social security payments 
may be conditional on employment status or income level, but they are unable 
to incorporate some of the core features of such schemes, namely that “con-
tinued receipt of benefits is conditional on the recipient making demonstrable 
efforts to search for new employment, on being available for employment, 
and on accepting suitable job offers… These features modify the conclusions 
drawn with respect to the impact of unemployment benefit” (Atkinson, 1995: 
106). 
According to Verlaat (2016):
 
Designing social assistance schemes policymakers face the challenge to 
provide claimants with means of subsistence while incentivising them to 
transition from welfare to work or other forms of societal participation. A 
common strategy to control the behaviour of claimants and prevent people 
from free-riding the scheme are performance-based benefit payments, 
most commonly punitive sanctions [which] aim to increase the cost of non-
compliance with the welfare scheme regulations and in this way incentivise 
claimants to change their actions in accordance with the programme rules. 
Accordingly, claimants lose parts of their benefits if they do not comply 
with job search requirements or guidelines on skill development. 
In the simplified framework employed by neoclassical economics, condi-
tions and sanctions can only serve to promote labour market effort. But this 
assumes that the institutions charged with monitoring the behaviour of 
claimants themselves have the information and incentives to carry out the task 
effectively. In fact, it is plausible that, due to the manner in which conditions 
are devised and monitored, claimants devote time and effort to fulfil bureau-
cratic requirements when they would be better off engaging in job search 
and skills development activities of their own design. Furthermore, recent 
insights from behavioural economics suggests that pecuniary incentives (such 
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as sanctions) serve to ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation (Verlaat and De Bruijn, 
2016). Not only that, but people act according to principles of reciprocation; 
if they feel they are being treated unfairly or with suspicion by the welfare 
bureaucracy, they are likely to respond in kind, reducing their effort to the bare 
minimum required to ensure continued receipt of benefit. On the other hand, 
people tend to reward trust with good behaviour (ibid.). 
In summary, although in the UK the conditions attached to out-of-work 
benefits “have been highly effective” according to Gregg (2008), we note 
a number of caveats. Firstly, the empirical evidence to which Gregg refers 
cannot be separated from the context of poverty and unemployment traps 
exacerbated by high withdrawal rates. Secondly, it is unclear to which aspects 
of the conditionality and support regimes Gregg (ibid.) discusses we should 
attribute the positive outcomes he finds. Specifically, to what extent is it the 
punitive, compulsory elements (which conflict fundamentally with principles 
of basic income) or the personalised support (which is entirely consistent with 
an unconditional payment)? We simply don’t know whether labour market 
withdrawal would increase or decrease if benefits were made unconditional, 
and active labour market policies were disentangled from the social security 
regime. 
One final issue to note is the effect of the threat of punitive sanctions on 
‘job match quality’. To the extent that individuals would be unable to refuse an 
unsuitable job and wait for one more appropriate to their skills and interests, 
punitive conditions may reduce match quality. Indeed, match quality has long 
been a core pillar of the efficiency argument in favour of generous unemploy-
ment insurance entitlements more generally (Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999; 
Caliendo et al., 2013).   
    
Basic Income as Exit Option
 
Some advocates, far from downplaying the extent to which basic income 
would result in labour market withdrawal, cite this as a distinct advantage. 
Guy Standing, for example, sees basic income as potentially transformative of 
the very nature of work itself9. According to Standing (2013), the concept of 
a ‘right to work’ beloved on the political left only makes sense in the context 
of the income security provided through an unconditional basic income. 
Standing’s reasoning is simple. Firstly, he distinguishes ‘work’ and ‘labour’ – 
where the former has use value and the latter exchange value – questioning 
the apparently absolute prioritisation of the latter. Secondly, he points out 
that for ‘right to work’ to have any conceptual value, the term must also imply 
a right not to work; in other words, it implies that work must be freely chosen 
and not obligatory. This can only be the case if the individual is not compelled 
to participate in the labour market, which occurs only in the context of a basic 
income unattached to labour market obligations.
9. As Standing has “long argued, a basic income is not primarily a means of compensating those without 
jobs, but is a means of providing basic security, a means of redistribution, a means of liberation and a means 
of gaining ecological balance and control. These are all strong reasons that do not depend on any level of 
unemployment” (2013: 34).
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Thus, while individuals are compelled to accept employment they would 
not freely choose, they are subject to oppression10 from which basic income 
provides an ‘exit option’ (Widerquist, 2013; see Birnbaum and De Wispelaere, 
2016 for a critical review). It is questionable whether the possibility that the 
introduction of UBI could reduce labour supply is inherently bad, since it 
would expand the possibilities for engaging in socially-valuable activities 
outside of the labour market. Activities which may be under-valued from a 
societal perspective include caring for children and elderly relatives, engaging 
in voluntary and charitable service, education and skills development, and 
‘pre-competitive’ entrepreneurial activities. Thus, provision of an exit option 
would serve efficiency-related objectives as well as promoting ethical goals. 
On the latter, Offe (2008: 14) reasons as follows: 
The undeserved gift of income enjoyed by “idle lazybones” can be justified 
not only because it cuts administrative expenses and their specific kind 
of loss of freedom that results from being ordered to accept some kind of 
work, but also because the alleged scandal of a (strictly individualised and 
universal allocation of) income without work is just the mirror image of the 
quite commonplace scandal of work without income performed by those 
who supply undeniably useful (though not market-valued) activities such 
as care work and voluntary services of all sorts. Thus the “positive” injustice 
from which non-working recipients would benefit is partly offset by an 
abolition of the “negative” injustice from which many non-receiving “work-
ers” suffer today. 
Wage Rates, Bargaining Power and Exploitation
 
Issues pertinent to the question of whether labour supply would expand 
or contract relate also to the conditions under which labour is performed. 
Assuming that basic income functions as an in-work benefit or wage subsidy, 
and that employers have some monopsony power over workers, there is 
a danger that basic income “would aggravate the problem of low pay and 
subsidise inefficient employers” (Parker, 1991: 13) leading to a proliferation 
of ‘lousy’ jobs. Such effects are the corollary of the alleviation of the high 
marginal effective tax rates and bureaucratic traps depicted above. Following 
Kenworthy (2015), there are two distinct reasons to expect downward pressure 
on wages:  
In the presence of the subsidy, employers might offer a lower wage than 
they otherwise would, and workers may be willing to accept a lower wage. 
Also, the subsidy may increase the supply of less-educated people seeking 
jobs, and without an increase in employer demand for such workers, this 
rise in supply is likely to push wages down.
10. Three related forms of oppression comprise the basis of the Marxist critique of capitalist economy: 
exploitation, domination and alienation. Exploitation involves the (unjust) extraction of surplus labour from 
the worker by their employer; domination, the arbitrary capacity of an individual to interfere in the choices 
of another (in this case, of the employer in those of the worker); and alienation, the sense of psychological 
separation that the worker feels with respect to their labour and its products.
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The logic of this argument as it pertains to basic income is largely based 
on evidence of the wage suppressive effects of in-work benefits – necessarily, 
given the lack of empirical evidence on basic income per se – and in our view, 
the conclusions have somewhat limited validity when applied to the latter. In-
work benefits are by necessity conditional not only on a work test but also on 
a means test. Thus, the combination of means-testing and work conditionality 
that characterises in-work benefits results in two implications:
• Workers are not able to reduce their labour and continue receiving benefit 
payments. 
• Workers are (relatively) indifferent between higher or lower pay; the state 
tops up their income to an acceptable level anyway in the case of the 
latter.   
Thus theoretically speaking, means-tested in-work benefits can only 
suppress the reservation wage. By contrast, precisely because the payment of 
basic income is not conditional on employment or income, the effect on the 
reservation wage is ambiguous: it lowers the amount of employment income 
required to achieve an acceptable total income (exerting downwards pressure 
of wages) but at the same time, it permits individuals unwilling to work at 
the prevailing wage rate to enjoy a higher level of consumption regardless. 
Furthermore, because basic income generally implies lower marginal effec-
tive tax rates compared to in-work benefits, workers will be more sensitive to 
changes in wage rate, as they would keep a larger proportion of wage hikes 
than under a withdrawable tax credit. 
As Gray (2017) argues, the wage suppression effect of the removal of 
poverty and unemployment traps would be pitched against the increased bar-
gaining power of the low-paid due to the exit option; the relative magnitude of 
these effects depends crucially on the level of payments: 
A basic income that was high enough to enable people to refuse low pay 
or very insecure work would probably reduce the total of hours worked 
and the number of jobs offered… But if the basic income was not high 
enough to enable people to refuse ‘bad’ jobs, it would have the opposite 
effect – low pay would be more acceptable and employers would recruit 
more easily at low wages than if there was no basic income. It is impossible 
to say, a priori, how much would be ‘high enough’ to mark the tipping point 
or boundary between these two effects, above which labour supply falls. 
Moreover, the tipping point could vary according to socioeconomic group 
and region.
Thus, as Van Parijs (2004) explains: basic income does indeed create “a 
potential for offering and accepting low-paid jobs that currently do not exist”, 
the effect of which may be to increase labour supply and reduce wages. 
However, as he continues:
If the concern is not to keep poor people busy at all cost but rather to 
provide them with access to meaningful paid activity, the very uncondi-
tional nature of a basic income is a crucial advantage: it makes it possible 
“Precisely because 
the payment of 
basic income is 
not conditional on 
employment or 
income, the effect on 
the reservation wage 
is ambiguous"
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to spread bargaining power so as to enable (as much as is sustainable) the 
less advantaged to discriminate between attractive or promising and lousy 
jobs11.
Thus, for Van Parijs (2004) the prospect of downward pressure on wage 
rates is less important than the consideration that individuals are free(r) to 
refuse work and therefore, would be less vulnerable to exploitation. Taking this 
argument one step further, Lord (2016) argues that in the presence of a basic 
income, labour market regulations (for example, minimum wages or legislation 
prohibiting zero-hour contracts) would be unnecessary and indeed, counter-
productive – a conclusion that is explicitly refuted by Gray (2017). 
 
The Reshuffle Effect
 
At face value at least, there appears to be some tension between the claims 
of advocates with respect to labour market effects. Advocates keen to stress 
the immediate feasibility of basic income argue that labour market effects are 
likely to be positive, with inactive individuals discouraged by high marginal 
effective tax rates and the uncertainty engendered by ‘bureaucratic traps’ 
entering paid employment. On the other hand, advocates of basic income as 
liberation from work stress labour market exit – or at least the threat thereof 
– as a positive virtue. They envisage withdrawal from the labour market as indi-
viduals seek to establish a more optimal balance of labour, work and leisure. 
On closer inspection, this tension is easily reconciled (from a conceptual 
point of view, at least). According to Van Parijs et al. (2000), basic income 
is unique in fulfilling the functions of two core welfare state policies, each 
designed to address the problems of unemployment and inactivity in different 
ways: in-work benefits, which are designed to reduce unemployment and 
poverty traps and thus increase the number of people in paid employment, 
and chosen-time subsidies, which aim to compensate individuals for reduc-
ing their labour effort. This in turn results in what Groot and Van Der Veen 
(2000: 24) call ‘the reshuffle effect’: “more full-time workers will choose to 
work part-time, freeing up jobs for the unemployed, while at the same time 
these unemployed have greater incentives to accept part-time jobs”. 
The simple and intuitive idea is that some people do not have enough paid 
work while others would like to do less (in order to more effectively balance 
work and care responsibilities, for example, or even to spend more time at 
leisure); basic income helps both groups to achieve more optimal outcomes.  
 
11. Van Parijs suggests that means-unconditionality and work-unconditionality are logically independent 
but “intrinsically linked as components of a strong proposal”. The policy prevents exploitation that might arise 
from the removal of poverty and unemployment traps alongside a requirement to seek and accept offers of 
work. If people were not only free but obliged to take low-paying jobs, exploitation would surely follow. At the 
same time, the policy prevents exclusion that might arise from a policy that releases people from any obligation 
to accept work, but sharply reduces their payments when they do so. In such circumstances, as a result of 
financial penalties, employment would become all but unattainable for individuals lacking marketable skills or 
the capacity to work significant numbers of hours, leading to a highly dualistic labour market; such individuals 
would have income security but their right to work would be circumscribed.
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Contribution of our Study to Debates Around Work Incentives
 
The theoretical consequences of basic income for the labour market are 
complex, with empirical evidence offering little clarity on the core issues. Basic 
income would have contradictory effects on labour supply, the net effect of 
which would be hard to predict. Specifically, effects would be determined by 
variation at the level of the individual (e.g. their preferences, earning potential, 
and financial relationships with family members) and in the features of the 
basic income (especially with respect to generosity). In Gray’s (2017) concise 
depiction, “the higher the basic income in relation to the individual’s hourly 
wage, the greater would be the likely reduction in labour supply from people 
already in paid work”. 
We address a subset of the issues discussed in the preceding paragraphs, 
relating to the financial incentives faced by different groups of individuals, 
as measured by the participation tax rate and marginal effective tax rate. 
In doing so, we only address issues pertaining to the financial incentives of 
working (or working more) vis-à-vis not working (or working less). We compare 
these indicators under three basic income schemes with the existing system 
of means-tested in- and out-of-work benefits, in which work incentives are 
already heavily distorted in comparison to those pertaining to the free market. 
We cannot say whether these effects will dominate over others that might 
run in the opposite direction; even if we observe improved financial returns to 
work compared to inactivity, we still cannot discount that the unconditional 
nature of basic income may nevertheless result in labour market withdrawal. 
Similarly, we have no clear metric of how different groups are expected to 
respond to variation in incentives. The purpose of our analysis is simply to 
provide some empirical meat around the largely theoretical bones of the basic 
income/labour market debate.  
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As in our previous working paper (Martinelli, 2017), this analysis employs the 
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) microsimulation model and is based 
on the 2014/15 version of the Family Resources Survey. Please refer to that 
paper for a more detailed methodological discussion of the microsimulation 
approach.
Basic Income Schemes Analysed in This Paper
For three levels of payment, we analyse what we consider to be the most 
plausible implementation mode (in terms of interactions with wider tax and 
benefit systems) modelled in the previous paper1. Specifically, we examine the 
following three schemes:
Model A
UBI set at the level of the tax saving implied by personal income tax allowance 
(PITA)
• Combined with the withdrawal of PITA and Child Benefit (CB)
• Taken into account in the calculation of all means-tested benefits 
Model B
UBI set at the level of existing benefits 
• Combined with the withdrawal of PITA, Basic State Pension (BSP), Carer’s 
Allowance (CA), CB, Child Tax Credit (CTC), ESA, Income Support, 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), Pension Credit (PC) and WTC 
• Taken into account in the calculation of other means-tested benefits 
• With income tax rates and National Insurance Contributions (NICs) set to 
approximate fiscal neutrality within the existing tax band structure 
Model C 
UBI set at the level of existing benefits with premiums for individuals deter-
mined as disabled or severely disabled 
• Combined with the withdrawal of PITA, BSP, CA, CB, CTC, ESA, IS, JSA, PC 
and WTC
• Taken into account in the calculation of other means-tested benefits
• With income tax rates and National Insurance Contributions (NICs) set to 
approximate fiscal neutrality within the existing tax band structure.
1. As in the previous paper, we disregard schemes similar to those examined in Reed and Lansley (2016) and 
Torry (2016b) to avoid duplication; this does not reflect any judgement about the desirability or feasibility of 
those schemes in comparison to the ones modelled herein.
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These schemes correspond to Models 1.4, 2.5 and 3.5 respectively in our 
previous working paper. 
Why these particular schemes? All three plausibly balance adherence to 
the various goals and principles motivating interest in basic income with 
concerns about administrative, financial and political feasibility. (Again, we are 
not claiming that these schemes represent the ‘most successful’ or ‘optimum’ 
balance of design features, and indeed we dispute whether it is possible to 
identify such features in an objective or apolitical manner.)  
Model A reflects a stream of interest in basic income that views it as a fairly 
prosaic exercise in tax reform, as opposed to a large-scale reorganisation 
of the welfare system (e.g. Painter, 2016). The personal income tax allow-
ance (PITA) can be viewed as a benefit accruing to everyone earning at least 
£11,000; converting this allowance into a universal payment “would rectify 
some of the current distributional anomalies of the personal allowance where 
those who earn the least receive less support”. Of course, the reform would 
have fiscal implications, as analysed in our previous paper. Perhaps more 
importantly, questions arise about how such a change would affect work 
incentives, given that a number of low earners, paying zero income tax in the 
existing system, would pay tax at the basic rate on their first pound of income. 
On the other hand, by providing an income ‘floor’ not subject to means-test-
ing, and reducing payments of means-tested benefits, there may be offsetting 
reductions in withdrawal rates. The implications for marginal effective tax 
rates – and in particular how different groups are affected – are uncertain and 
warrant further investigation.  
Model B represents a straightforward attempt to simulate a basic income 
pitched at the level of standard income replacement benefits and benefits 
designed to compensate for the costs of raising children. Of the two revenue-
neutral schemes modelled in the previous paper, the one we replicate here 
retains the existing tax band structure – under the assumption that this would 
represent a more administratively-straightforward reform, but also due to the 
more favourable (progressive) distributional consequences. As we showed in 
our previous paper, this scheme has some adverse implications for household 
poverty levels. It is worthwhile, therefore, to explore the incidence of losses 
across different groups in greater depth. This is done via comparison between 
Model B and Model C, which explicitly aims to compensate for the differ-
ence between the ‘standard’ levels of payment and those made to disabled 
individuals.
Operationalisation of Variables
Output Variables
Proportions of benefit units experiencing gains and losses of different 
magnitudes
As in our previous working paper, we report absolute levels of weekly equiv-
alised disposable income and the absolute change (gain or loss) in weekly 
equivalised disposable income. We then use these data to construct a new 
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series of binary (dummy) indicators, based on whether each benefit unit has 
experienced an increase, a reduction, or no change in income. We construct 
further dummy variables taking into account the magnitude of the experienced 
changes – indicating incidences in which gains or losses exceed 10% and 
25% of pre-reform income levels. These binary variables are easily converted 
into summary statistics at alternative levels of aggregation (operationalisa-
tion of which is discussed below). The result is that we are able to report the 
proportions of winners and losers – further distinguishing those experiencing 
moderate and large gains or losses – for politically-salient demographic catego-
ries.  
Financial work incentives 
 
Financial work incentives depend upon the “amount of income an individual re-
ceives without working, the gross wage rate an individual can command when 
working and the taxes and benefits payable from/to them at different levels of 
earnings” (IFS, 2015: 22). Following Adam et al. (2006), we distinguish between 
indicators of financial incentives to work at all and indicators of financial incen-
tives to progress in work or increase work effort marginally.
In terms of the former, two common measures are the replacement rate and 
the participation tax rate. The replacement rate measures the ratio of ‘out-of-
work’ income to ‘in-work’ income (i.e. how generous social protection is in 
comparison to self-provision). The participation tax rate measures the propor-
tion of gross earnings lost through tax and/or benefit withdrawal. In this paper 
we focus on PTRs, defined as follows:
With respect to the incentive to work more or progress in the labour market, 
the most common measure is the marginal effective tax rates, which measures 
the proportion of each additional unit of earned income lost to tax and/or 
benefit withdrawal. The METR is defined formally as follows:
 
Where ∆ denotes a positive or negative change. In principle, we can calcu-
late these measures based on either individual income or family/household 
 
PTR = 1 —
 Net income if individual works — Net income if individual does not work ____________________________________________________________________________________
     Gross income
 
 
METR =
 
  ∆ net income _________________
∆ gross income
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income2. However, because we typically assume that income is shared within 
households – although this assumption is itself subject to some dispute – we 
are more interested in how changes in individual income affect total house-
hold income. In any case, because many UK benefits are calculated in relation 
to the benefit unit, benefit income cannot be accurately assigned to individu-
als. For these reasons, we measure net income at the household level and 
gross income at the individual level. Thus, we are able to examine how varying 
an individual’s earned income – while maintaining their partner’s earned 
income at a constant level – would affect net household income. In house-
holds headed by couples, we can report individuals’ work incentives based 
on characteristics such as their ‘breadwinner’ status (i.e. whether they are the 
primary or secondary earner within the household) and sex. We can also report 
averages of these individual statistics for different groups. 
 
Participation tax rates 
While it is straightforward to calculate PTRs for employed individuals based on 
their current wage rate, in order to calculate these for unemployed individuals, 
we need to make assumptions about hypothetical wage rates and working 
patterns. For the purposes of our analysis, if an individual is not working, 
we calculate their PTR on the basis of 16 hours per week paid at the national 
minimum wage.  
Marginal effective tax rates/deduction rates
 
The IPPR model calculates METRs by simulating an increase in income of £1 
for each individual in a benefit unit separately, maintaining other sources 
of income constant, and records the effect of the change on income at the 
household (or more accurately, benefit unit) level. The concept of a ‘marginal’ 
change in economics implies an increase or decrease of smallest possible 
increment of income; however, following Adam et al. (2006: 23), “such a 
measure can be criticised because, in practice, it is virtually impossible for 
individuals to vary their labour supply to the extent that their earnings change 
by 1p a week. In addition, rounding rules inherent in the calculation of taxes 
and benefit and tax credits sometimes mean that EMTRs calculated for a 1 
penny change are atypical and uninformative about the slope evaluated over 
a slightly larger margin”. The operationalisation of a marginal change is also 
important because some benefit rules permit small amounts of income to 
be disregarded, followed by subsequently high withdrawal rates on earned 
2. As noted by Adam et al. (2006: 7): “this choice will affect our impression of the strength of the financial 
reward to work. For example, a low-earning person living with a high-earning partner may have no independent 
income if he or she does not work, and therefore would have a very low replacement rate – or a strong financial 
incentive to work – when calculated using individual income. However, the same individual would have a very 
high replacement rate when calculated using family income, because whether he or she works makes little 
difference proportionally to the family’s income. By contrast, the participation tax rate for this individual is likely 
to be very low (if the individual is only paying income tax and employee national insurance contributions on 
a small portion of their earnings, and is in a family too rich to be entitled to tax credits) regardless of whether 
individual or family income is used for the calculation”.
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income (as is the case for Income Support, Jobseekers Allowance and ESA3, 
for example). 
It is worth noting that other models calculate METRs using alternative 
marginal units. For example, Adam et al. (2006), using the IFS microsimulation 
model, take a marginal unit to be an increase of 5% in gross earnings. Ceteris 
paribus, using a smaller marginal increase would be likely to result in lower 
METRs, as a higher proportion of individuals would be subject to income disre-
gards. Our findings may thus underplay the extent of improvements in METRs 
implied by UBI reforms which eliminate a number of means-tested benefits – 
thus reducing withdrawal rates – at the cost of higher income tax rates and the 
withdrawal of the personal income tax allowance; small marginal increases in 
income are not exempt from the positive rates of income tax in the same way 
as they are exempt from the withdrawal of means-tested benefit payments. 
Of course, it is particularly important to accurately understand the impacts of 
reforms on the labour market incentives of recipients of means-tested ben-
efits, a group known to be subject to disproportionately high withdrawal rates, 
leading to unemployment and poverty traps. For these reasons, our analysis of 
the implications of UBI schemes on METRs must be treated with caution. 
 
Categorical (Grouping) Variables for Distributional Analysis
 
A number of the categorical (grouping) variables used to distinguish outcomes 
in this paper follow our previous working paper: these are income quintile and 
family type. However, we employ a more detailed measure of labour market 
status here compared to the previous paper. All of these variables are based 
on standardised categorical variables reported in the Family Resources Survey. 
In addition, we construct and examine a number of new categorical variables 
relating to sex, breadwinner status, disability status and benefit recipiency 
status.  
 
Sex 
 
Because sex is an individual level variable, with income measured at the 
household (benefit unit) level, only single-adult households or same-sex 
couple households contribute towards variation in income based on sex at the 
individual level (as described above). This does not pose a problem for work 
incentives, which are also measured at the individual level. We also distinguish 
households based on the sex of household head, defined as the main bread-
winner (operationalisation of which is described below).  
Disability Status
 
We construct four indicators of disability status. The first, operating at the 
3. Adam et al. (2006: 10) present details of how METRs vary with hours worked for a single parent with one 
child on Income Support. In this (not atypical) scenario, METRs jump from zero to 100% as the individual earns in 
excess of £20. If such an individual were represented in our findings, assuming they were not working, we would 
report an METR of 0% (the rate applicable to the first £1 of earnings). On the other hand, assuming they were 
earning £20, their METR would be calculated at 100%.
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individual level, identifies people as disabled if they receive one disability-re-
lated benefit (PIP, DLA, Attendance Allowance, Severe Disablement Allowance 
or Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit), are registered as disabled with their 
local authority, or self-report as having a limiting condition. At the household 
level, we construct an indicator identifying benefit units in which the main 
earner is disabled, for those in which there is at least one disabled adult 
(regardless of breadwinner status), and for those in which there is at least one 
disabled child.    
Breadwinner Status
 
Breadwinner status is determined by identifying the adult with the highest 
level of individual income in each household (excluding households compris-
ing more than one benefit unit). Thus, for couples, we identify primary and 
secondary earners; in single-adult households, each adult will be the primary 
earner by default. 
 
Means-Testing Status
 
We construct an indicator of means-testing status operating at the household 
level, concerned with whether households are in receipt of one or more of any 
of the following means-tested benefits: Council Tax, Housing Benefit, Income 
Support, Income-Based Jobseekers Allowance, Income-Related ESA, and 
Pension Credit. 
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Overall Distribution of Gains and Losses
Table 1 compares the implications of our three schemes across the whole 
population. Model A has the most favourable effects, reflecting the fact that it 
is not revenue neutral; households gain at the expense of the exchequer, by an 
equivalised average of just over £20 per week. 60% of households gain from 
this scheme, with 6% experiencing no change in income and 34% experienc-
ing a loss of income – of which 0% (rounded to the nearest figure) experience 
losses exceeding 10% of their initial income. Model B sees a majority of 
households (56%) gain, many by a large percentage of their base income, but 
a significant minority of 42% of households lose out from the scheme at the 
point of implementation. Crucially, these include 15% of households losing 
over 10%, and 6% of households losing over 25%, of their base income. Model 
C has a similar marginal majority of households experiencing gains and losses 
to Model B, and in fact it has slightly less favourable figures in this regard, with 
55% and 44% of households gaining and losing out respectively; on the other 
hand, it sees considerably smaller proportions of households losing out by 
large amounts. 
Table 1: Average Change in Equivalised Disposable Income 
and Proportions of Winners and Losers across Whole 
Population 
Model Base 
income (£)
Change in 
income (£)
Proportion of Benefit Units in Category
Gain >10% >25% No change Lose >10% >25%
A 601.74 20.18 0.60 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.34 0.00 0.00
B 601.74 -0.36 0.56 0.24 0.07 0.02 0.42 0.15 0.06
C 601.74 0.62 0.55 0.29 0.10 0.01 0.44 0.10 0.01
Gains and Losses by Income Quintile
Turning to the analysis of gains and losses by income quintile, all of the 
schemes are broadly progressive in terms of the ratios of winners and losers; 
for each scheme, the poorest quintile sees the highest proportions of winners 
and the richest quintile see the highest proportion of losers. Indeed, for the 
revenue-neutral schemes (Models B and C), the 5th quintile is the only one 
to exhibit losses on average, the magnitude of which represent transfers to 
the lower income groups. For Model A, although a majority of households in 
quintiles 4 and 5 lose, there are no losses exceeding 10% of base income in any 
income grouping. 
This is in contrast to Models B and C, both of which see large proportions of 
households in every quintile losing out by significant amounts. Furthermore, 
Model B sees the largest proportions of losers with significant losses in 
quintiles 1 to 3. Thus, though it may be correct to say that the scheme is 
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broadly progressive on average, large numbers of poor and middle-income 
households would be significantly worse off: 7% of the poorest households 
lose over 25% of their initial income and over a fifth of quintile 2 – the quintile 
that perhaps best represents the ‘just managing’ cohort – would lose over 10% 
of their income compared to the base scenario. Thus, while the richer quintiles 
lose more in absolute terms, those in the poorer quintiles who lose do so by a 
proportionally greater amount of their income. 
Model C is more progressive; the fifth quintile exhibits the highest propor-
tion of households losing over 10% and the proportions of households losing 
over 25% of their initial income are low in every quintile. Nevertheless, a 
significant minority (8%) of households in quintiles 1 to 3 would stand to lose 
over 10% of their base income. 
Table 2: Average Change in Equivalised Disposable Income 
and Proportions of Winners and Losers, by Pre-Reform 
Equivalised Disposable Income Quintile 
Model Quintile Base 
income (£)
Change in 
income (£)
Proportion of Benefit Units in Category
Gain >10% >25% No change Lose >10% >25%
A 1 (poorest) 229.26 29.27 0.81 0.52 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.00
2 382.40 21.16 0.69 0.25 0.00 0.07 0.24 0.00 0.00
3 490.10 15.59 0.59 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.35 0.00 0.00
4 654.41 13.97 0.48 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.51 0.00 0.00
5 (richest) 1252.46 20.92 0.43 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00
B 1 (poorest) 229.26 19.10 0.65 0.47 0.25 0.07 0.28 0.16 0.07
2 382.40 2.98 0.62 0.33 0.06 0.01 0.37 0.23 0.12
3 490.10 1.17 0.62 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.38 0.21 0.08
4 654.41 8.14 0.60 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.10 0.03
5 (richest) 1252.46 -33.20 0.34 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.06 0.00
C 1 (poorest) 229.26 35.59 0.75 0.55 0.31 0.05 0.20 0.08 0.01
2 382.40 29.06 0.66 0.44 0.12 0.01 0.33 0.08 0.02
3 490.10 25.05 0.66 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.34 0.08 0.02
4 654.41 3.99 0.51 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.49 0.06 0.01
5 (richest) 1252.46 -90.56 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.19 0.00
Gains and Losses by Family Type
There are significant differences between family types with respect to gains 
and losses arising from the three proposed schemes. Across the board (for all 
three schemes) winners are prevalent among pensioner couples and couples 
with children. Model A also benefits single parents significantly, with 99% 
of lone-parent households better off, over half of them by more than 10% of 
their base household income. However, lone parents fare very badly in the 
two revenue-neutral schemes, with approximately two-thirds losing income 
compared with the base scenario. Single pensioners do very badly from all of 
31 IPR Report
the proposals, probably as a result of paying tax on previously exempt income; 
couples on the other hand are treated relatively generously under an individu-
alised UBI compared with the existing system, in which payments for couples 
are reduced to account for shared expenditure (i.e. economies of scale at the 
household level).  
Table 3: Average Change in Equivalised Disposable Income and 
Proportions of Winners and Losers, by Family Type
Model Family type Base 
income 
(£)
Change 
in income 
(£)
Proportion of Benefit Units in Category
Gain >10% >25% No 
change
Lose >10% >25%
A Pensioner couple 571.33 10.58 0.65 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.27 0.00 0.00
Pensioner single 479.14 1.89 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.56 0.00 0.00
Couple with 
children
619.77 42.21 0.99 0.32 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Couple w/o 
children
816.70 11.64 0.41 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.56 0.00 0.00
Lone parent 428.75 42.40 0.99 0.52 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Single w/o 
children
456.58 15.34 0.37 0.27 0.12 0.09 0.54 0.00 0.00
B Pensioner couple 571.33 17.85 0.65 0.29 0.07 0.00 0.35 0.08 0.01
Pensioner single 479.14 -60.42 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.76 0.55 0.17
Couple with 
children
619.77 37.35 0.86 0.44 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.01
Couple w/o 
children
816.70 -8.40 0.50 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.50 0.07 0.02
Lone parent 428.75 -31.16 0.31 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.38 0.14
Single w/o 
children
456.58 -17.65 0.46 0.19 0.15 0.05 0.49 0.20 0.14
C Pensioner couple 571.33 47.11 0.77 0.51 0.19 0.00 0.23 0.03 0.00
Pensioner single 479.14 -20.13 0.46 0.18 0.04 0.04 0.50 0.28 0.08
Couple with 
children
619.77 19.44 0.77 0.38 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.04 0.00
Couple w/o 
children
816.70 -29.99 0.41 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.59 0.09 0.00
Lone parent 428.75 -19.94 0.34 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.27 0.02
Single w/o 
children
456.58 -14.86 0.33 0.21 0.16 0.04 0.63 0.11 0.01
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Gains and Losses by Labour Market Status
In the previous working paper, we examined labour market status in a 
simplified way, distinguishing working and non-working households. Here, 
we introduce numerous additional categories. Turning first to Model A, the 
majority of households in each labour market category gain, in some instances 
considerably, with the exception of households in which both members of 
a couple work. For Model A, gains are largest among single earner couple 
households and ‘other’ workless households (a category which includes 
inactivity due to disability). This contrasts completely with Model B, in which 
the latter category loses out significantly, with more than half losing over 10% 
of their base income. These results confirm our suspicion that a uniform basic 
income combined with the elimination of means-tested support would be very 
harmful to disabled people as a group. Of course, this was the motivation for 
Model C, which represents an attempt to compensate disabled households for 
the loss of disability premiums and supplements. It is not quite successful in 
doing so, since just under half of ‘other’ workless households lose as a result of 
the implementation of Model C, with a fifth of households losing significantly. 
Nevertheless, Model C represents a clear and unambiguous improvement 
for this demographic, compared to Model B. The implications of the three 
schemes with respect to disability are examined in further detail below. 
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Another notable insight from the breakdown of distributional effects by labour 
market status is that Model B is most advantageous to working households in 
which at least one adult is not a full-time employee. All workless households, 
including pensioner households, lose out. This is consistent with theory which 
implies that basic income will be most beneficial to low-income households 
with non-standard working patterns (including precarious employment) 
which are not entitled to support in the current system; individuals reliant on 
means-tested benefits, by contrast, are likely to be disadvantaged by a system 
of uniform payments that does not take their specific additional needs into 
account. Of course, households in which all adults work full time are likely 
to experience losses as their earnings are subject to higher rates of tax that 
surpass their basic income payments. 
Interestingly, Model C is advantageous to all labour market categories but 
two (‘one or more full-time self-employed’ and ‘single/couple all in full-time 
work’). Of these, working households in which all adults work full time are 
made significantly worse off, paying for the majority of the gains experienced 
by the other household types. 
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Gains and Losses by Sex
The manner in which gains and losses from our three schemes are distributed 
according to sex is an important consideration. On average, women are 
more likely to live in poverty compared to men – a consequence of numerous 
complex factors, including labour market disadvantage, lone parenthood (the 
incidence of which falls predominantly on women), and shortfalls in insurance 
contributions for female pensioners. It is a proud claim of many advocates 
that basic income furthers the cause of gender equality by strengthening the 
position of poorly paid, part-time and precarious workers and recognising 
the contribution of unpaid carers – groups in which women feature dispro-
portionately. We cannot address these claims here; our more modest goal is 
to provide an account of the distributional implications of our three schemes 
vis-à-vis sex. 
Turning to the individual-level analysis, as shown in Table 5 below, we 
remind the reader that any differences are due to the sex characteristics of 
single-adult and same-sex couple households, as discussed in Section 3. In the 
base scenario, men have disposable weekly incomes approximately £25 higher 
than women. There is actually very little difference in how each sex fares under 
each scheme; the biggest difference is for Model B, in which men gain about 
£2.50 per week and women lose roughly £3. 
As shown in Table 6, there is a more significant difference in the patterns 
of gains and losses in relation to the sex of the household head (defined as 
the main earner, as discussed in Section 3). Male-headed households enjoy 
base scenario income levels significantly higher than female-headed ones. 
Model A is almost neutral with respect to the change in income, although a 
higher proportion of men gain compared to women. However, Models B and 
C are considerably more favourable to male-headed households. In both 
cases, a clear majority (in excess of 60%) of male-headed households gain 
from the proposals, whereas for female-headed households less than half 
of households gain. This strikes an important blow against basic income’s 
gender-egalitarian credentials; further research is needed to identify the 
demographic and familial characteristics and consequent patterns of benefit 
recipiency that drive this divergence, in order for advocates to prevent any 
inadvertent inequalities arising in implementation. 
In this regard, it is likely that lone parenthood, which is predominantly a 
circumstance experienced by women (around 90% of lone-parent families are 
headed by the mother, according to Gingerbread1), is the main reason that 
female-headed households lose income as a result of basic income schemes 
being implemented. Specifically, while schemes B and C aim to replace the 
standard benefits to which families are entitled at equivalent rates (and in the 
case of Model C, we have further aimed to replace disability premiums and 
supplements at equivalent rates), one important type of benefit supplement 
we fail to model here is the childcare supplement of WTC. It is noteworthy 
that this group (lone parents) are particularly likely to receive the childcare 
1. https://goo.gl/xmrKZv
“Male-headed 
households enjoy 
base scenario 
income levels 
significantly higher 
than female-headed 
ones"
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supplement (HMRC, 2015).  
Another possible contributory factor for a higher proportion of female-
headed households losing out from the proposals is that women tend to live 
longer and thus are relatively more likely to live alone as pensioners; our family 
type analysis showed that single pensioners would expect to do very badly from 
the implementation of our illustrative schemes, particularly Models B and C. 
Table 5: Average Change in Equivalised Disposable Income 
and Proportions of Winners and Losers, by Sex
Model Sex Base 
Income (£)
Change in 
Income (£)
Proportion of Benefit Units in Category
Gain >10% >25% No change Lose >10% >25%
A Male 615.59 19.74 0.58 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.36 0.00 0.00
Female 589.27 20.58 0.61 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.33 0.00 0.00
B Male 615.59 2.51 0.59 0.26 0.07 0.02 0.40 0.13 0.05
Female 589.27 -2.95 0.54 0.23 0.06 0.02 0.44 0.17 0.07
C Male 615.59 1.00 0.55 0.30 0.11 0.01 0.44 0.09 0.01
Female 589.27 0.28 0.55 0.29 0.09 0.01 0.44 0.11 0.01
Table 6: Average Change in Equivalised Disposable Income 
and Proportions of Winners and Losers, by Sex of Household 
Head (Highest Earner)
Model Sex Base 
Income (£)
Change in 
Income (£)
Proportion of Benefit Units in Category
Gain >10% >25% No change Lose >10% >25%
A Male 652.96 22.11 0.66 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.30 0.00 0.00
Female 588.57 18.90 0.55 0.19 0.03 0.06 0.38 0.00 0.00
B Male 652.96 10.01 0.63 0.29 0.05 0.01 0.37 0.11 0.04
Female 588.57 -17.10 0.45 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.52 0.23 0.08
C Male 652.96 8.54 0.61 0.34 0.09 0.01 0.38 0.08 0.01
Female 588.57 -11.11 0.49 0.22 0.05 0.01 0.50 0.13 0.02
Gains and Losses by Disability Status
We turn now to the distribution of gains and losses arising from the three 
schemes in relation to the characteristic of disability status, operationalised in 
four different ways. Table 7 breaks down the implications by disability status 
at the level of the individual, showing clear distributional differences between 
the three schemes with respect to their relative generosity to disabled and 
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non-disabled individuals. Non-disabled people have significantly higher equiv-
alised income levels in the base scenario, confirming the well-documented 
fact that disability is a strong predictor of poverty, even before considering 
the additional costs that disabled people face in their daily lives. Model A is 
approximately equally favourable to disabled and non-disabled people alike. 
However, Models B and C diverge sharply in their implications for each group. 
Model B sees non-disabled adults gain an average of £5.65 per week from the 
change, while disabled people lose almost £60 on average. 73% of disabled 
people lose out from the imposition of the scheme; over a quarter of them 
lose at least 25% of their income. Model C reverses the bias against disabled 
people. Non-disabled people experience a small drop in their equivalised 
incomes, while disabled people are over £30 better off, on average, per week. 
In this scheme, 68% of them gain and 32% lose. However, even in this scenario, 
11% of the group lose out by at least 10% of their initial base scenario income.
Table 7: Average Change in Equivalised Disposable Income 
and Proportions of Winners and Losers, by Disability Status
Model Disability 
status 
(individual)
Base 
Income 
(£)
Change 
in Income 
(£)
Proportion of Benefit Units in Category
Gain >10% >25% No change Lose >10% >25%
A Non-disabled 612.60 19.99 0.59 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.36 0.00 0.00
Disabled 495.19 22.09 0.64 0.26 0.01 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.00
B Non-disabled 612.60 5.65 0.60 0.26 0.07 0.02 0.39 0.11 0.04
Disabled 495.19 -59.32 0.26 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.73 0.55 0.27
C Non-disabled 612.60 -2.44 0.54 0.28 0.10 0.01 0.45 0.10 0.01
Disabled 495.19 30.69 0.68 0.40 0.13 0.00 0.32 0.11 0.01
The patterns of gains and losses are very similar for each of the alterna-
tive ways of operationalising disability status at the household level, so we 
omit any discussion here, and refer the reader to appendices 1 – 3 for further 
details.
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A Note on Interpretation of PTRs and METRs
The interpretation of the PTR is the proportion of total gross earned income 
lost through taxation and withdrawn benefits, compared to not working at all. 
For individuals who do not work, we assume a counterfactual of 16 hours per 
week paid employment at the national minimum wage. The METR is inter-
preted as the proportion of each additional (or initial) pound of gross earnings 
lost through taxation and withdrawn benefits. Abstracting from associated 
changes to the tax system, basic income schemes of equivalent value to exist-
ing means-tested systems would tend to reduce PTRs and METRs on average, 
because they are not withdrawn as earned income increases like means-tested 
benefits are. However, in each of the schemes modelled here, we do make 
substantial changes to the tax system; the overall effect will depend on the 
relative magnitude of improvements to work incentives through the elimina-
tion of means-testing vis-à-vis deteriorated work incentives as a result of 
higher tax rates.  
It is also worth repeating here that reported METRs and changes therein 
must be treated with some caution. As discussed above, using the marginal 
unit of £1 means that METRs are likely, in many instances, to cover the initial 
income disregard granted to recipients of means-tested benefits, and not 
the subsequently very high withdrawal rates. This phenomenon is likely to 
understate the extent of improvements in METRs due to basic income, which 
as noted above, may improve work incentives in comparison to means-tested 
systems precisely because unlike the latter, they are not withdrawn as income 
rises. In other words, these data may reflect increases in METRs that arise as 
a result of increased tax rates, but not reductions in METRs due to reduced 
withdrawal rates (since high withdrawal rates that pertain to the existing 
means-tested system are not necessarily captured in reference to the first £1 
of earnings). 
NB. ‘+ve change’ refers to a reduction in METRs reflecting stronger/im-
proved work incentives; ‘-ve change’ refers to an increase in METRs reflecting 
weaker/deteriorated work incentives.
Work Incentive Implications Overall and by Breadwinner 
Status
Table 8 shows the implications of our three basic income schemes for average 
PTRs across the population, and for primary and secondary earners separately. 
The population average PTR in the base scenario is 36%, with main earners 
facing average PTRs of 42% and second earners facing PTRs of 25%. For every 
scheme, secondary earners experience a large increase in PTRs in comparison 
to main earners. This reflects the fact that secondary earners make less money, 
and are more likely to be in the position, in the base scenario, where they pay 
no income tax or national insurance on a large proportion of their individual 
income.  
Models A and C unambiguously increase PTRs across the population on 
average and for primary and secondary breadwinners; large majorities face a 
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deterioration in work incentives (based on this indicator). However, for Model 
B, primary earners face reduced PTRs, implying improved financial work incen-
tives. On average, and across all schemes, a majority of individuals face weaker 
work incentives, with large numbers facing increases in their personal PTRs 
in excess of 25%. However, for each scheme there are still large numbers of 
individuals facing improved work incentives. The schemes which incorporate 
significant changes to the existing means-tested structure of the benefits 
system (Models B and C) have more favourable work incentive effects; this is 
unsurprising given our theoretical expectations, as discussed in Section 2.   
Turning to the METRs, reported in Appendix IV, our findings show that 
individuals face average rates of 28% across the population as a whole, with 
higher rates for primary compared to secondary earners. This indicator reports 
weaker average work incentives across the board for all schemes, with even 
fewer individuals experiencing improved work incentives, compared to the PTR 
indicator. An important characteristic of Model A is that the vast majority of 
individuals face no change in their METRs.
Table 8: Average Change in PTRs and Proportions of Benefit Units 
Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work Incentives, across 
Whole Population and by Breadwinner Status
Model Breadwinner 
status
Base 
PTR
Change 
in PTR
Proportion of Individuals in Category
+ve change >10% >25% No change -ve change >10% >25%
A Primary 0.42 0.03 0.28 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.59 0.27 0.14
Secondary 0.25 0.10 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.74 0.65 0.54
Total 0.36 0.05 0.25 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.64 0.40 0.28
B Primary 0.42 -0.05 0.50 0.39 0.28 0.00 0.50 0.39 0.24
Secondary 0.25 0.08 0.30 0.27 0.22 0.00 0.70 0.67 0.57
Total 0.36 -0.01 0.43 0.35 0.26 0.00 0.57 0.49 0.36
C Primary 0.42 0.02 0.39 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.61 0.51 0.38
Secondary 0.25 0.13 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.74 0.71 0.67
Total 0.36 0.06 0.34 0.28 0.20 0.00 0.66 0.58 0.48
Work Incentive Implications by Income Quintile
Next we turn to work incentive effects disaggregated by income quintile, as 
shown in Table 9. In each of the schemes, a higher proportion of individuals 
from the lower income deciles face improved work incentives, compared to 
the richer deciles. Turning to Model A, none of the quintiles have a majority of 
individuals facing improved work incentives measured by the PTR.  However, 
for Models B and C, the majority of individuals in the lowest income quintile do 
face improved work incentives; for Model B, the same is also true for the second 
quintile. Indeed, Model B has generally positive implications for work incentives 
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for the bottom three quintiles of the income distribution; on average PTRs fall 
for each group. In Model C, by comparison, average PTRs only fall for quintile 
1. This difference is to be expected; Model C has a more generous payment 
structure and requires higher taxes, both of which characteristics increase 
PTRs. Even for Model B, which has the most favourable work incentive effects, 
large proportions of individuals face weaker incentives. In every quintile, over 
a quarter of individuals face PTR increases of at least 25% of the base scenario 
PTR. 
Turning to METRs reported in Appendix V, again the vast majority of individ-
uals face no change in their work incentives under Model A. For both Models B 
and C, only the first quintile experience improved METRs. A significant propor-
tion of individuals from every quintile face METRs at least 25% higher than the 
experience in the base scenario.
 
Table 9: Average Change in PTRs and Proportions of Benefit 
Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work Incentives, by 
Income Quintile
Model Income 
Quintile
Base 
PTR
Change 
in PTR
Proportion of Benefit Units in Category
+ve change >10% >25% No change -ve change >10% >25%
A 1 (poorest) 0.44 0.02 0.44 0.32 0.22 0.04 0.53 0.40 0.29
2 0.40 0.07 0.26 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.67 0.39 0.28
3 0.35 0.06 0.21 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.66 0.32 0.23
4 0.28 0.05 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.69 0.39 0.31
5 (richest) 0.28 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.69 0.45 0.28
B 1 (poorest) 0.44 -0.12 0.68 0.61 0.52 0.00 0.32 0.28 0.23
2 0.40 -0.05 0.57 0.46 0.36 0.00 0.43 0.37 0.26
3 0.35 -0.02 0.49 0.40 0.29 0.00 0.51 0.43 0.28
4 0.28 0.05 0.29 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.71 0.58 0.41
5 (richest) 0.28 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.85 0.74 0.53
C 1 (poorest) 0.44 -0.08 0.61 0.54 0.46 0.00 0.39 0.34 0.29
2 0.40 0.02 0.46 0.39 0.31 0.00 0.54 0.45 0.38
3 0.35 0.06 0.38 0.30 0.21 0.00 0.62 0.54 0.42
4 0.28 0.10 0.22 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.78 0.70 0.57
5 (richest) 0.28 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.90 0.85 0.70
Work Incentive Implications by Labour Market Status
Table 10 shows the changes in PTRs and the proportion of individuals facing 
stronger or weaker work incentives as a result of the three schemes, disaggre-
gated by (detailed) labour market status. The data show that Model A results 
in weaker work incentives for all groups except workless households charac-
terised by unemployment. In contrast, Model B results in stronger average 
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work incentives for five out of the eight groups – all workless households, plus 
part-time working households and couple households in which one individual 
works full time and one is inactive. However, it is notable that even within 
these groups, large proportions of individuals face weaker work incentives. 
When we turn to Model C, work incentives are much weaker on average. Only 
for households in which the head or spouse is unemployed are PTRs stronger 
on average. 
Turning to METRs, reported in Appendix VI, findings are similar to those for 
PTRs with respect to the differences between schemes, although reductions in 
METRs are much less pronounced, almost certainly as a result of the manner in 
which the variable has been constructed (discussed in Section 3).
44
Ta
bl
e 
10
: A
ve
ra
ge
 C
ha
ng
e 
in
 P
TR
s 
an
d 
Pr
op
or
ti
on
s 
of
 B
en
ef
it
 U
ni
ts
 E
xp
er
ie
nc
in
g 
St
ro
ng
er
 a
nd
 
W
ea
ke
r W
or
k 
In
ce
nt
iv
es
, b
y 
La
bo
ur
 M
ar
ke
t S
ta
tu
s
M
od
el
La
bo
ur
 M
ar
ke
t S
ta
tu
s
B
as
e 
PT
R
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 P
TR
Pr
op
or
ti
on
 o
f B
en
ef
it
 U
ni
ts
 in
 C
at
eg
or
y
+v
e 
ch
an
ge
>1
0%
>2
5%
N
o 
ch
an
ge
-v
e 
ch
an
ge
>1
0%
>2
5%
A
O
ne
 o
r m
or
e 
fu
ll-
ti
m
e 
se
lf
 e
m
pl
oy
ed
 
0.
33
0.
07
0.
25
0.
13
0.
10
0.
05
0.
70
0.
47
0.
36
Si
ng
le
/c
ou
pl
e 
al
l i
n 
fu
ll-
ti
m
e 
w
or
k 
0.
34
0.
04
0.
09
0.
03
0.
02
0.
02
0.
90
0.
44
0.
28
C
ou
pl
e,
 o
ne
 in
 fu
ll-
ti
m
e,
 o
ne
 p
ar
t-
ti
m
e 
0.
30
0.
08
0.
20
0.
08
0.
06
0.
03
0.
77
0.
55
0.
40
C
ou
pl
e,
 o
ne
 fu
ll-
ti
m
e,
 o
ne
 n
ot
 w
or
ki
ng
 
0.
40
0.
06
0.
51
0.
25
0.
16
0.
05
0.
44
0.
32
0.
25
N
o 
fu
ll-
ti
m
e,
 o
ne
 o
r m
or
e 
pa
rt
-t
im
e 
0.
37
0.
03
0.
37
0.
25
0.
16
0.
12
0.
51
0.
33
0.
24
W
or
kl
es
s,
 h
ea
d 
or
 s
po
us
e 
ag
ed
 6
0 
or
 o
ve
r 
0.
36
0.
03
0.
23
0.
09
0.
04
0.
27
0.
50
0.
29
0.
20
W
or
kl
es
s,
 h
ea
d 
or
 s
po
us
e 
un
em
pl
oy
ed
 
0.
61
-0
.0
6
0.
66
0.
55
0.
41
0.
03
0.
31
0.
21
0.
12
W
or
kl
es
s,
 o
th
er
 in
ac
ti
ve
 
0.
28
0.
10
0.
42
0.
40
0.
33
0.
04
0.
53
0.
49
0.
40
B
O
ne
 o
r m
or
e 
fu
ll-
ti
m
e 
se
lf
 e
m
pl
oy
ed
 
0.
33
0.
01
0.
51
0.
40
0.
29
0.
00
0.
49
0.
41
0.
31
Si
ng
le
/c
ou
pl
e 
al
l i
n 
fu
ll-
ti
m
e 
w
or
k 
0.
34
0.
05
0.
26
0.
17
0.
09
0.
00
0.
74
0.
61
0.
45
C
ou
pl
e,
 o
ne
 in
 fu
ll-
ti
m
e,
 o
ne
 p
ar
t-
ti
m
e 
0.
30
0.
09
0.
33
0.
24
0.
13
0.
00
0.
67
0.
57
0.
46
C
ou
pl
e,
 o
ne
 fu
ll-
ti
m
e,
 o
ne
 n
ot
 w
or
k-
in
g 
0.
40
-0
.0
3
0.
64
0.
58
0.
47
0.
00
0.
36
0.
31
0.
22
N
o 
fu
ll-
ti
m
e,
 o
ne
 o
r m
or
e 
pa
rt
-t
im
e 
0.
37
-0
.0
1
0.
54
0.
45
0.
38
0.
00
0.
46
0.
39
0.
26
W
or
kl
es
s,
 h
ea
d 
or
 s
po
us
e 
ag
ed
 6
0 
or
 o
ve
r 
0.
36
-0
.0
7
0.
43
0.
36
0.
29
0.
00
0.
57
0.
50
0.
28
W
or
kl
es
s,
 h
ea
d 
or
 s
po
us
e 
un
em
pl
oy
ed
 
0.
61
-0
.3
1
0.
88
0.
81
0.
75
0.
00
0.
12
0.
11
0.
10
W
or
kl
es
s,
 o
th
er
 in
ac
ti
ve
 
0.
28
-0
.0
6
0.
60
0.
58
0.
55
0.
00
0.
40
0.
39
0.
36
C
O
ne
 o
r m
or
e 
fu
ll-
ti
m
e 
se
lf
 e
m
pl
oy
ed
 
0.
33
0.
05
0.
41
0.
33
0.
24
0.
00
0.
58
0.
50
0.
39
Si
ng
le
/c
ou
pl
e 
al
l i
n 
fu
ll-
ti
m
e 
w
or
k 
0.
34
0.
09
0.
17
0.
13
0.
06
0.
00
0.
83
0.
72
0.
56
C
ou
pl
e,
 o
ne
 in
 fu
ll-
ti
m
e,
 o
ne
 p
ar
t-
ti
m
e 
0.
30
0.
13
0.
26
0.
17
0.
10
0.
00
0.
74
0.
67
0.
55
C
ou
pl
e,
 o
ne
 fu
ll-
ti
m
e,
 o
ne
 n
ot
 w
or
k-
in
g 
0.
40
0.
01
0.
60
0.
53
0.
40
0.
00
0.
40
0.
35
0.
29
N
o 
fu
ll-
ti
m
e,
 o
ne
 o
r m
or
e 
pa
rt
-t
im
e 
0.
37
0.
03
0.
46
0.
40
0.
33
0.
00
0.
54
0.
47
0.
38
W
or
kl
es
s,
 h
ea
d 
or
 s
po
us
e 
ag
ed
 6
0 
or
 o
ve
r 
0.
36
0.
02
0.
32
0.
26
0.
20
0.
00
0.
68
0.
62
0.
52
W
or
kl
es
s,
 h
ea
d 
or
 s
po
us
e 
un
em
pl
oy
ed
 
0.
61
-0
.2
5
0.
85
0.
77
0.
73
0.
00
0.
15
0.
14
0.
12
W
or
kl
es
s,
 o
th
er
 in
ac
ti
ve
 
0.
28
0.
05
0.
57
0.
53
0.
51
0.
00
0.
43
0.
42
0.
40
45 IPR Report
Work Incentive Implications by Means-Testing Status
One of the most important issues to address is the extent to which work 
incentives are improved by the group most profoundly affected by unemploy-
ment and poverty traps: those entangled in the means-tested support systems 
that give rise to excessively high PTRs and METRs. Arguably, the labour market 
response of this group could more than compensate for the generalised de-
terioration in work incentives due to higher tax rates. Indeed, turning to Table 
11, we observe that in the base scenario, average PTRs are significantly higher 
for individuals in households in which means-tested benefits are in payment 
compared to those in which they are not (50% and 32% respectively). 
For Model A, individuals face increases in PTRs on average, of roughly the 
same magnitude regardless of whether they received means-tested benefits 
in the base scenario. However, for both Models B and C, individuals who faced 
means-testing in the base scenario face stronger work incentives on average; 
under Model B, 58% of individuals in such circumstances face PTR at least 25% 
lower compared to the base scenario; and for Model C, the same is true of 
almost half of the individuals in that group. 
Again, METRs, reported in Appendix VII, do not imply improved work incen-
tives reflecting the findings for PTRs. On the contrary, the data show larger 
increases in METRs on average for recipients of means-tested benefits. We 
attribute this discrepancy to the facts that, firstly, many individuals on means-
tested benefits face income tax and NI rates of zero in the base scenario, 
implying large increases for Models B and C, and secondly, the marginal unit 
of £1 used in the IPPR model to calculate METRs is unlikely to fully capture the 
high marginal withdrawal rates of means-tested benefits over a more interme-
diate income range (these issues were discussed at length in Section 3). 
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Table 11: Average Change in PTRs and Proportions of Benefit 
Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work Incentives, by 
Means-Testing Status
Model Benefit 
Status
Base 
PTR
Change 
in PTR
Proportion of Benefit Units in Category
+ve change >10% >25% No change -ve change >10% >25%
A No means-
tested 
benefits in 
payment
0.32 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.67 0.40 0.28
At least one 
of ESA, IS, 
JSA, PC, 
CTB and HB 
in payment
0.50 0.06 0.38 0.27 0.18 0.08 0.54 0.35 0.25
B No means-
tested 
benefits in 
payment
0.32 0.02 0.37 0.29 0.21 0.00 0.63 0.53 0.37
At least one 
of ESA, IS, 
JSA, PC, 
CTB and HB 
in payment
0.50 -0.17 0.72 0.64 0.58 0.00 0.28 0.25 0.22
C No means-
tested 
benefits in 
payment
0.32 0.07 0.29 0.23 0.17 0.00 0.71 0.64 0.52
At least one 
of ESA, IS, 
JSA, PC, 
CTB and HB 
in payment
0.50 -0.04 0.63 0.54 0.47 0.00 0.37 0.32 0.27
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In this paper, we have presented microsimulation evidence about the effects 
of three basic income schemes, focusing on distributional and work incentive 
implications in turn. Our distributional analysis built on previous analysis in 
two main ways. Firstly, we extended beyond the focus on average change 
in income of the previous working paper to determine the proportions of 
individuals or households in each category winning and losing, by various 
degrees of magnitude, for each scheme. Secondly, we considered the effects 
with respect to two important characteristics – disability and sex – that are 
associated with vulnerability to poverty. The work incentive analysis focused 
predominantly on participation tax rates, given the limitations of marginal 
effective tax rates as an indicator discussed in depth above.
Summary of Proportions of Households Gaining and 
Losing Income
Our core insight is that for the most part, even when particular groups gain 
(lose) on average, there are usually still non-trivial numbers of individuals and 
households who are worse off (better off). 
Model A imposes far fewer losses (and very negligible significant losses) on 
households – this is by design since the proposal is not revenue neutral (mean-
ing it represents a net transfer from the exchequer to households); under this 
scheme we only eliminate the personal allowance and Child Benefit to pay for 
a basic income equalling the rate of payment of the former and exceeding that 
of the latter.  
However it appears to be a defining characteristic of schemes in which 
basic income serves to replace the mainstay of existing benefits (Models B 
and C) that large numbers of people will inevitably experience significant 
losses of income. Furthermore, despite the generally progressive character of 
the schemes modelled here, these losses are not concentrated among richer 
groups; on the contrary, they are proportionally larger for the bottom three 
income quintiles. 
Turning to the profile of winners and losers by family type, a vast majority of 
single pensioners lose out from Model B and a narrow majority from Model C. 
Further research is required to examine the specific causes (in terms of sourc-
es of lost income) of the losses among so many single-pensioner households 
but the most important is probably that while the basic income compensates 
for the lost Basic State Pension, pensioners also pay more tax on their income 
from other sources as a result of the elimination of the PITA. High proportions 
of families without children and lone-parent families also lose out as a result of 
the implementation of Models B and C. 
In terms of the profiles of winners and losers by labour market status, 
Models B and C have very different implications. Model B, without additional 
payments related to disability, is detrimental to the majority of workless 
households as well as those in which all adults are in full-time employment. It 
is beneficial to the majority of those with ‘intermediate’ working patterns – i.e. 
households in which at least one adult works part-time or in which one part-
ner works and the other does not. In contrast, Model C concentrates losses 
on one group – households in which all adults work full-time – with around 
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three-quarters of such households losing out. 
We cannot escape the conclusion that even if we were to find the imposi-
tion of such hardship morally acceptable, such schemes are surely politically 
unrealistic in the absence of some means of compensating losers, at least in 
the short and medium term (perhaps as a transitional arrangement).
Summary of Implications of Illustrative Schemes by Sex 
and Disability Status
Women and disabled people face considerable disadvantages with respect 
to labour market participation, leading to significantly higher poverty rates. 
The welfare system mitigates against labour market disadvantage through 
decommodification, but does so imperfectly; both sex and disability status are 
still associated with inequality with respect to net equivalised income levels. In 
recent years, gender and disability impact assessments have become increas-
ingly important aspects of ex ante tax and benefit policy evaluations (e.g. 
Bennett (2011) and Grey-Thompson (2012) on the gender and disability impacts 
of UC respectively). It is particularly important that tax/benefit changes do not 
inadvertently further impoverish disadvantaged groups. 
So how do the illustrative schemes analysed in this paper fare by this 
criterion? Model A is broadly neutral and no significant losses (exceeding 10% 
of previous income) are experienced by any group; this is unsurprising given 
that Model A does not significantly alter the existing structure of benefits. 
However, Models B and C both have adverse effects for significant numbers of 
women and disabled people. Model B fares particularly badly, with a majority 
of female-headed households and disabled adults losing out at the point of 
implementation. Model C performs only marginally better for female-headed 
households, but much better for disabled individuals (and households affected 
by disability). Even so, a large number of disabled individuals still stand to lose 
out from the proposals. 
Designing basic income schemes that replace a large proportion of existing 
benefits without adverse distributional consequences for groups currently 
reliant on means-tested premiums and supplements is very difficult. In order 
to mitigate against adverse effects for disabled people, Model C provides 
additional payments at the cost of an additional £38bn. An important avenue 
for future research would be to model additional payments to compensate for 
the elimination of childcare subsidies in the WTC in order to mitigate against 
losses among lone-parent households. The difficulty, as with disability premi-
ums and supplements, would be to control costs while ensuring payments 
are consistent with the principles of universalism. The alternative is to run 
a means-tested system or systems in parallel with the universalism of basic 
income, but this would mean retaining some of the worst features of such 
systems in terms of stigma, intrusion, administrative cost, and poverty and 
unemployment traps caused by steep marginal withdrawal rates.
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Summary of Work Incentive Analysis
We have provided some important empirical detail to complement theoreti-
cal discussion around the work incentive effects of basic income. While we 
recognise that ‘static’ indicators such as PTRs and METRs cannot replace ex 
post empirical evaluation of the labour market effects of reforms, nevertheless 
they help to build up a picture of the potential for basic income to instigate 
increases or contractions in labour supply.   
On average across the population, PTRs and METRs increase as a result of 
all three illustrative basic income schemes. However, Model B – which replaces 
the same range of benefits as Model C but incorporates lower tax rates – has 
the most desirable effects, in terms of the proportions of individuals and 
households experiencing stronger work incentives. 
In all three models, work incentives deteriorate more on average for second 
earners than for primary breadwinners. This appears to be a result of the fact 
that many second earners are unemployed (the category was operationalised 
as the person in a couple with lower personal income, whether or not they are 
in work) or working part-time jobs, with the income of their partner meaning 
that they are entitled to little or no means-tested support. They feel the full 
effect of the elimination of the PITA and increases in National Insurance and 
income tax rates. For these individuals, our illustrative schemes represent 
unambiguous increases in participation and marginal effective tax rates. While 
Models A and C are also detrimental on average to the work incentives facing 
main earners, in Model B this group faces improved average participation tax 
rates. However, even for this group, the majority of individuals face weaker 
work incentives.
To summarise so far, most individuals face weaker work incentives as a 
result of all three illustrative schemes. Does this imply that basic income would 
have negative consequences with respect to labour market participation? 
Not necessarily. This distribution of work incentive effects is such that we 
can imagine the effects of stronger work incentives on particularly sensitive 
groups to outweigh the more generalised effect of weaker work incentives 
over the wider population. 
Indeed, turning to our findings broken down by income quintile, labour 
market status and means-testing status, this appears to be a distinct possibil-
ity. Across all schemes, the lower income quintiles contain larger proportions 
of households facing improved PTRs. For Models B and C, the vast majorities 
of workless households, and households in receipt of at least one means-
tested benefit, face improved PTRs.  
An important avenue for future research would be to examine labour supply 
elasticities in relation to these specific groups, to determine the overall net 
effects and impacts on different types of labour supply (i.e. relating to the skill 
level of employment). This is an endeavour in which ongoing and upcoming 
empirical experiments will also be invaluable. 
 
 
“On average across 
the population, PTRs 
and METRs increase 
as a result of all three 
illustrative basic 
income schemes. 
However, Model 
B – which replaces 
the same range of 
benefits as Model 
C but incorporates 
lower tax rates – has 
the most desirable 
effects"
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Policy Implications: Towards Desirable and Feasible Basic 
Income Schemes
The illustrative schemes examined in this paper are probably all unfeasible 
in at least one sense. Model A has perhaps the least adverse distributional 
effects, but is not revenue neutral; the exchequer would need to find an 
additional £36bn. Funding the proposal fully through reductions in benefits 
or tax increases would have implications for household incomes that are not 
examined here. Models B and C have profound distributional consequences; 
while these may tend on average to be progressive in the sense that losses fall 
predominantly on rich households, there are great number of poorer house-
holds that also lose. Furthermore, even if losses were confined to households 
above the poverty line, they include large losses (in excess of 10% of original 
income) that would surely be politically unacceptable. In any case, the analy-
sis draws our attention to the difficulty involved in designing basic income 
schemes that satisfactorily compensate existing beneficiaries of the system 
while retaining the principles of universalism and administrative simplicity. 
The work incentive analysis highlights that achieving revenue neutrality 
implies higher participation and marginal tax rates for large swathes of the 
population. As argued above, however, this does not necessarily nullify argu-
ments that basic income would enhance labour supply. Furthermore, it should 
be recalled that the arguments in favour of basic income are not reducible to 
favourable distributional implications or improved work incentives. There are 
other consequences of basic income that are not picked up by microsimula-
tion analyses. These relate to, inter alia, the provision of basic income security 
as an unconditional right, without fear of sanction or stigma; improved 
protection in the face of increasing labour market precarity and irregular 
employment; and the strengthening of workers’ bargaining position due to the 
presence of a (partial) exit option. 
On the other hand, there are two fundamental normative/ethical arguments 
which appear to severely limit the political prospects for UBI: that UBI severs 
the link between social security transfer and ‘desserts’; and that it severs 
the link between transfers and ‘need’. In both cases, uniformity of payments 
clashes with conceptions of equality that suggest that payments should be 
proportional to some specified characteristic or other. In the case of desserts, 
decoupling social protection from labour market participation could be seen 
to encourage idleness and to be inherently unfair. In this view, numerical 
equality of transfers irrespective of recipients’ work effort and with no corre-
sponding reciprocal contribution would be unjust (Anderson, 1999). 
With respect to need, a narrow understanding of horizontal equality holds 
that to the extent that everyone is the same, they should be treated the same; 
in contrast vertical equality suggests that to the extent that everyone is dif-
ferent, they should be treated differently. In the former conception, we might 
posit that a uniform UBI is appropriate, given the equal status of the rights 
of every citizen to receive some recompense for the private control of social 
‘commons’ and natural resources (Van Parijs, 1992). In the latter conception, 
in order to equalise important outcomes such as welfare or opportunity, 
resource transfers must necessarily vary according to specified characteristics 
of recipients. 
“The work incentive 
analysis highlights 
that revenue 
neutrality implies 
higher participation 
and marginal tax 
rates for large 
swathes of the 
population"
52Conclusion: Summary and Discussion of Key Findings
Clearly, when we consider that UBI may be funded from progressive taxa-
tion, net transfers are not of equal value; some people are net contributors and 
other net recipients. But the point stands that even a progressively funded UBI 
is relatively unrelated to need compared to more targeted systems of social 
security. Our research indicates that there is a great deal of inter-household 
variation in poverty levels even among groups of ‘similar’ households (e.g. 
those in which at least one adult is disabled; workless households; single 
parent households). Numerous circumstances affect households’ prospects 
for earning income in the labour market and the costs they have to bear; 
in combination, these factors determine their living standards. A uniform 
payment structure cannot compensate for this, which is why in almost every 
household group, there are both winners and losers in the schemes modelled 
here. 
As the findings of our previous working paper have already shown, if UBI is 
conceived as a single uniform payment replacing existing wage replacement 
benefits, then it must be either inadequate (i.e. it will raise poverty levels) or 
unaffordable (i.e. the fiscal cost will be too high). But, even in the case of the 
latter, UBI may still be seen as fundamentally inegalitarian – even if it leads to 
an absolute improvement in the material living standards of all poor house-
holds – if uniform payments favour households with fewer costs and unmet 
needs. This could lead to increased income inequality as households would 
benefit from the more generous UBI even if they had an adequate income 
without it. The addition of a flat-rate disability premium goes some way to-
wards compensating for variation in living standards but is clearly a fairly blunt 
instrument, unrelated to the actual variable costs of disability or to an indi-
vidual’s (in)capacity for work. The only way around these egalitarian concerns 
is to have a system of payments more closely related to additional costs and 
needs running parallel to the UBI – with all the attendant administrative issues 
this would entail. 
Advocates for basic income must address these normative and theoretical 
issues as well as make a robust case on the political and institutional feasibility 
of specific basic income schemes with respect to costs and distributional 
implications. Whether there exists a basic income scheme able to generate 
sufficiently broad support in the UK – given the demographic groups opposed 
on the grounds of self-interest, and given the complex normative trade-offs 
involved – is an open question. 
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Appendix I: Average Change in Equivalised Disposable 
Income and Proportions of Winners and Losers, by Disability 
Status of Household Head (Highest Earner) 
Model Disability status 
(household 
head)
Base 
income (£)
Change in 
income (£)
Proportion of benefit units in category
Gain >10% >25% No change Lose >10% >25%
A Non-disabled 675.62 23.38 0.65 0.17 0.02 0.02 0.33 0.00 0.00
Disabled 560.40 17.27 0.59 0.17 0.02 0.10 0.32 0.00 0.00
B Non-disabled 675.62 13.64 0.65 0.29 0.05 0.01 0.34 0.06 0.01
Disabled 560.40 -20.03 0.44 0.17 0.03 0.02 0.54 0.28 0.12
C Non-disabled 675.62 -10.97 0.51 0.24 0.05 0.01 0.48 0.10 0.01
Disabled 560.40 20.23 0.66 0.38 0.12 0.01 0.34 0.09 0.01
Appendix II: Average Change in Equivalised Disposable 
Income and Proportions of Winners and Losers, by 
Disability Status of Household (Presence of Disabled 
Adults) 
Model Disability  
status 
(household)
Base 
income 
(£)
Change 
in income 
(£)
Proportion of benefit units in category
Gain >10% >25% No change Lose >10% >25%
A No disabled 
adults
676.46 23.36 0.63 0.17 0.02 0.02 0.35 0.00 0.00
At least one 
disabled adult
557.43 18.66 0.60 0.19 0.04 0.08 0.32 0.00 0.00
B No disabled 
adults
676.46 11.15 0.63 0.28 0.05 0.01 0.36 0.07 0.01
At least one 
disabled adult
557.43 -10.41 0.50 0.21 0.06 0.02 0.48 0.23 0.1
C No disabled 
adults
676.46 -19.16 0.47 0.20 0.03 0.01 0.52 0.11 0.02
At least one 
disabled adult
557.43 16.93 0.63 0.37 0.14 0.01 0.36 0.09 0.01
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Appendix III: Average Change in Equivalised Disposable 
Income and Proportions of Winners and Losers, by 
Disability Status of Household (Presence of Disabled 
Children) 
Model Disability 
status
Base 
income (£)
Change in 
income (£)
Proportion of benefit units in category
Gain >10% >25% No change Lose >10% >25%
A No disabled 
chldren
633.37 20.04 0.61 0.16 0.02 0.05 0.34 0.00 0.00
At least one 
disabled child
529.81 46.31 0.98 0.43 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
B No disabled 
chldren
633.37 0.53 0.56 0.24 0.04 0.02 0.42 0.14 0.05
At least one 
disabled child
529.81 -11.52 0.51 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.49 0.32 0.13
C No disabled 
chldren
633.37 0.29 0.56 0.29 0.08 0.01 0.43 0.10 0.01
At least one 
disabled child
529.81 32.46 0.72 0.45 0.10 0.00 0.28 0.12 0.01
Appendix IV: Average Change in METRs and Proportions 
of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, across Whole Population and by Breadwinner 
Status 
Model Breadwinner 
status
Base 
METR
Change 
in METR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve 
change
>10% >25% No 
change
-ve 
change
>10% >25%
A Primary 0.30 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.83 0.09 0.06 0.04
Secondary 0.23 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.72 0.21 0.18 0.16
Total 0.28 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.80 0.13 0.10 0.08
B Primary 0.30 0.03 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.00 0.78 0.42 0.20
Secondary 0.23 0.07 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.01 0.76 0.29 0.12
Total 0.28 0.05 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.77 0.38 0.17
C Primary 0.30 0.07 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.80 0.76 0.39
Secondary 0.23 0.11 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.78 0.76 0.25
Total 0.28 0.08 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.79 0.76 0.34
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Appendix V: Average Change in METRs and Proportions 
of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, by Income Quintile 
Model Income 
quintile
Base 
METR
Change 
in METR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve change >10% >25% No change -ve change >10% >25%
A 1 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.29 0.55 0.46 0.41
2 0.31 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.62 0.24 0.19 0.15
3 0.26 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.84 0.08 0.07 0.05
4 0.27 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.94 0.03 0.03 0.03
5 0.34 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.94 0.01 0.01 0.01
B 1 0.18 0.10 0.67 0.61 0.54 0.00 0.33 0.25 0.17
2 0.31 0.00 0.47 0.43 0.38 0.00 0.53 0.27 0.10
3 0.26 0.04 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.78 0.35 0.10
4 0.27 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.94 0.36 0.11
5 0.34 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.94 0.45 0.31
C 1 0.18 0.13 0.64 0.55 0.52 0.00 0.36 0.30 0.21
2 0.31 0.03 0.44 0.39 0.37 0.00 0.56 0.50 0.22
3 0.26 0.08 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.80 0.77 0.31
4 0.27 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.95 0.94 0.32
5 0.34 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.95 0.94 0.42
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Appendix VII: Average Change in METRs and Proportions 
of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, by Means-Testing Status 
Model Benefit status Base 
METR
Change 
in METR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve 
change
>10% >25% No 
change
-ve 
change
>10% >25%
A No means-
tested benefits 
in payment
0.28 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.83 0.10 0.09 0.08
At least one of 
ESA, IS, JSA, PC, 
CTB and HB in 
payment
0.13 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.42 0.49 0.29 0.18
B No means-
tested benefits 
in payment
0.28 0.05 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.81 0.36 0.16
At least one of 
ESA, IS, JSA, PC, 
CTB and HB in 
payment
0.13 0.13 0.54 0.47 0.42 0.00 0.46 0.36 0.20
C No means-
tested benefits 
in payment
0.28 0.09 0c.17 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.83 0.80 0.32
At least one of 
ESA, IS, JSA, PC, 
CTB and HB in 
payment
0.13 0.16 0.51 0.44 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.41 0.31
Appendix VIII: Average Change in PTRs and Proportions 
of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, by Sex 
Model Sex Base 
PTR
Change 
in PTR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve change >10% >25% No change -ve change >10% >25%
A Male 0.38 0.03 0.28 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.60 0.31 0.19
Female 0.33 0.06 0.22 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.69 0.46 0.36
B Male 0.38 -0.03 0.44 0.34 0.25 0.00 0.56 0.45 0.28
Female 0.33 0.01 0.43 0.36 0.29 0.00 0.57 0.51 0.40
C Male 0.38 0.03 0.34 0.28 0.19 0.00 0.66 0.57 0.44
Female 0.33 0.06 0.35 0.30 0.24 0.00 0.65 0.59 0.51
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Appendix IX: Average Change in METRs and Proportions 
of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, by Sex 
Model Sex Base 
METR
Change 
in METR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve change >10% >25% No change -ve change >10% >25%
A Male 0.30 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.84 0.08 0.07 0.06
Female 0.25 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.76 0.17 0.14 0.12
B Male 0.30 0.04 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.00 0.79 0.38 0.17
Female 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.76 0.32 0.16
C Male 0.30 0.08 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.81 0.78 0.33
Female 0.25 0.10 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.00 0.77 0.75 0.30
Appendix X: Average Change in PTRs and Proportions of 
Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, by Sex of Household Head (Highest Earner) 
Model Sex Base 
PTR
Change 
in PTR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve change >10% >25% No change -ve change >10% >25%
A Male 0.34 0.06 0.25 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.64 0.43 0.32
Female 0.40 0.04 0.24 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.65 0.36 0.23
B Male 0.34 0.02 0.39 0.31 0.23 0.00 0.61 0.52 0.39
Female 0.40 -0.05 0.49 0.41 0.32 0.00 0.51 0.43 0.31
C Male 0.34 0.08 0.31 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.69 0.62 0.52
Female 0.40 0.02 0.40 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.60 0.52 0.43
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Appendix XI: Average Change in METRs and Proportions 
of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, by Sex of Household Head (Highest Earner) 
Model Sex Base 
METR
Change 
in METR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve 
change
>10% >25% No 
change
-ve 
change
>10% >25%
A Male 0.26 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.81 0.11 0.09 0.08
Female 0.30 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.78 0.15 0.11 0.08
B Male 0.26 0.06 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.00 0.79 0.38 0.17
Female 0.30 0.02 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.00 0.74 0.37 0.17
C Male 0.26 0.09 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.81 0.78 0.35
Female 0.30 0.06 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.00 0.75 0.73 0.33
Appendix XII: Average change in PTRs and Proportions 
of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, by Disability Status 
Model Disability 
status 
(individual)
Base 
PTR
Change 
in PTR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve 
change
>10% >25% No 
change
-ve 
change
>10% >25%
A Non-disabled 0.35 0.04 0.25 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.66 0.39 0.27
Disabled 0.37 0.10 0.26 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.58 0.38 0.31
B Non-disabled 0.35 0.00 0.42 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.58 0.49 0.35
Disabled 0.37 -0.10 0.59 0.55 0.51 0.00 0.41 0.39 0.30
C Non-disabled 0.35 0.05 0.33 0.27 0.20 0.00 0.67 0.59 0.48
Disabled 0.37 0.05 0.50 0.45 0.38 0.00 0.50 0.46 0.42
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Appendix XIII: Average Change in METRs and 
Proportions of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and 
Weaker Work Incentives, by Disability Status  
Model Disability 
status 
(individual)
Base 
METR
Change 
in METR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve 
change
>10% >25% No 
change
-ve 
change
>10% >25%
A Non-disabled 0.29 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.80 0.12 0.10 0.09
Disabled 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.71 0.19 0.15 0.13
B Non-disabled 0.29 0.04 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.78 0.34 0.16
Disabled 0.10 0.14 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.00 0.69 0.59 0.19
C Non-disabled 0.29 0.08 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.79 0.77 0.31
Disabled 0.10 0.17 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.00 0.70 0.66 0.56
Appendix XIV: Average Change in PTRs and Proportions 
of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, by Disability Status of Household Head 
Model Disability 
status 
(household 
head)
Base 
PTR
Change 
in PTR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve 
change
>10% >25% No 
change
-ve 
change
>10% >25%
A Non-disabled 0.36 0.04 0.25 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.67 0.42 0.29
Disabled 0.37 0.06 0.24 0.12 0.07 0.15 0.61 0.38 0.27
B Non-disabled 0.36 0.02 0.39 0.30 0.21 0.00 0.61 0.51 0.39
Disabled 0.37 -0.05 0.48 0.41 0.33 0.00 0.52 0.45 0.32
C Non-disabled 0.36 0.06 0.32 0.25 0.18 0.00 0.68 0.60 0.49
Disabled 0.37 0.06 0.38 0.31 0.24 0.00 0.62 0.56 0.47
Appendix XV: Average Change in METRs and Proportions 
of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, by Disability Status of Household Head 
Model Disability 
status 
(household 
head)
Base 
METR
Change 
in METR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve 
change
>10% >25% No 
change
-ve 
change
>10% >25%
A Non-disabled 0.33 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.79 0.13 0.10 0.08
Disabled 0.20 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.81 0.12 0.09 0.08
B Non-disabled 0.33 0.03 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.00 0.78 0.33 0.18
Disabled 0.20 0.08 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.76 0.48 0.16
C Non-disabled 0.33 0.07 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.80 0.77 0.30
Disabled 0.20 0.11 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.00 0.77 0.73 0.44
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Appendix XVI: Average Change in PTRs and Proportions 
of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, by Disability Status of Household (Presence 
of Disabled Adults) 
Model Disability  
status 
(household)
Base 
PTR
Change 
in PTR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve 
change
>10% >25% No 
change
-ve 
change
>10% >25%
A No disabled 
adults
0.36 0.04 0.25 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.68 0.41 0.28
At least one 
disabled adult
0.35 0.06 0.25 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.62 0.39 0.28
B No disabled 
adults
0.36 0.02 0.39 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.61 0.51 0.38
At least one 
disabled adult
0.35 -0.03 0.47 0.40 0.32 0.00 0.53 0.46 0.32
C No disabled 
adults
0.36 0.05 0.32 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.68 0.59 0.48
At least one 
disabled adult
0.35 0.04 0.38 0.32 0.25 0.00 0.62 0.56 0.47
Appendix XVII: Average Change in METRs and Proportions 
of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, by Disability Status of Household (Presence of 
Disabled Adults) 
Model Disability  
status 
(household)
Base 
METR
Change 
in METR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve 
change
>10% >25% No 
change
-ve 
change
>10% >25%
A No disabled 
adults
0.33 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.80 0.13 0.10 0.08
At least one 
disabled adult
0.23 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.79 0.13 0.10 0.09
B No disabled 
adults
0.33 0.02 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.00 0.79 0.33 0.18
At least one 
disabled adult
0.23 0.07 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.75 0.40 0.15
C No disabled 
adults
0.33 0.06 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.81 0.78 0.29
At least one 
disabled adult
0.23 0.10 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.00 0.77 0.74 0.36
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Appendix XVIII: Average Change in PTRs and 
Proportions of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger 
and Weaker Work Incentives, by Disability Status of 
Household (Presence of Disabled Children) 
Model Disability 
status
Base 
PTR
Change 
in PTR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve 
change
>10% >25% No 
change
-ve 
change
>10% >25%
A No disabled 
chldren
0.36 0.05 0.24 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.64 0.40 0.28
At least one 
disabled child
0.44 0.08 0.32 0.20 0.15 0.01 0.66 0.45 0.31
B No disabled 
chldren
0.36 0.00 0.42 0.34 0.25 0.00 0.58 0.50 0.36
At least one 
disabled child
0.44 -0.10 0.71 0.67 0.55 0.00 0.29 0.25 0.21
C No disabled 
chldren
0.36 0.06 0.33 0.26 0.19 0.00 0.67 0.59 0.49
At least one 
disabled child
0.44 -0.06 0.67 0.60 0.48 0.00 0.33 0.28 0.23
Appendix XIX: Average Change in PTRs and Proportions 
of Benefit Units Experiencing Stronger and Weaker Work 
Incentives, by Disability Status of Household (Presence 
of Disabled Children) 
Model Disability 
status
Base 
METR
Change 
in METR
Proportion of benefit units in category
+ve 
change
>10% >25% No 
change
-ve 
change
>10% >25%
A No disabled 
chldren
0.27 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.81 0.12 0.09 0.08
At least one 
disabled child
0.41 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.55 0.34 0.26 0.20
B No disabled 
chldren
0.27 0.05 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.00 0.79 0.39 0.18
At least one 
disabled child
0.41 -0.06 0.66 0.61 0.55 0.00 0.34 0.14 0.10
C No disabled 
chldren
0.27 0.09 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.81 0.77 0.35
At least one 
disabled child
0.44 -0.06 0.67 0.60 0.48 0.00 0.33 0.28 0.23
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